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INTRODUCTION
NNOCENCE is not clearly a prerequisite to detention under the Federal
Material Witness Statute. That was the unremarkable principle the
United States. Supreme Court unanimously announced in the 2010 term
in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd2 The Court was asked to resolve whether a witness
could be constitutionally detained when the prosecutor is as interested in
making a case against the witness as he is in securing testimony.3 A five-
member majority went even further. It held that not only does using a
legitimate material witness warrant to arrest a criminal suspect not violate
clearly established law, it does not violate the law at all.4
Despite the common sense of the majority's bottom line, the legal
doctrine Justice Scalia used to reach the result was not as clear-cut as his
opinion suggests. No court prior to al-Kidd had previously considered
whether the government was permitted to have a legitimate and
illegitimate basis for arresting a material witness. Existing precedent
permitted arrests supported by probable cause to believe an individual
had committed a crime, however minor, regardless of the government's
motives.5 But existing precedent also provided that the government's
motive for engaging in suspicionless intrusions mattered.6 Under this latter
line of precedent, the government is not permitted to conduct a search or
seizure without suspicion unless its purpose is for something other than
the detection of crime.7 A/-Kidd fell between these lines of precedent.
Circumstances unique to al-Kidd made the government believe he was
in possession of helpful information, but did not give the government an
i Associate Professor of Law and Director, Criminal Justice Program, Duquesne
University School of Law. B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale. The Ninth
Circuit's opinion in al-Kidd cited the author's work on the history of material witness deten-
tion yet without any supporting authority arrived at historical conclusion at odds with the
author's. The author therefore filed an amicus brief with the United States Supreme Court in
this matter correcting the lower court's misunderstanding of the historical record and support-
ing Ashcroft's position in the matter.
2 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, i3i S. Ct. 2074, 2084-85 (20 11).
3 See id. at 2079.
.4 See id. at 2o85.
5 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996).
6 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,45 (2000).
7 Id. at 45-46.
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objective basis for believing him guilty of a crime. Practically, it would be
hard to explain how a suspected member of al-Qaeda may not be detained
on the same evidence permitting the detention of an innocent bystander,
but practical considerations were not part of the Court's opinion. The
Court's analysis suggested that the facts of the case easily situated it within
the strain of authority requiring no assessment of the government's motives
for the seizure.
This case drew a lot of attention for matters that were not part of the
legal issues being debated. The New York Times observed that the decision
"did not resolve whether the material witness law was misused under
President George W. Bush," and of course that is correct.' Only a very
narrow issue was before the Court. The issue was, in fact, so narrow that one
of the claims al-Kidd made against John Ashcroft appears to have survived
the very short opinion. The Supreme Court found that the Constitution is
not violated when material witnesses are detained as suspects.9 The Ninth
Circuit, however, found for al-Kidd on an issue not addressed in Ashcroft's
petition for certiorari. The lower court held that irrespective of the
constitutionality of pretextual detentions, Ashcroft's instructions to make
"aggressive" use of material witness detentions to hold suspects imposed a
duty on him to ensure that prosecutors were only seeking material witness
warrants where the statutory requirements were satisfied.' 0 The Supreme
Court's decision does not appear to alter this basis of liability and a trial to
determine whether he breached that duty could still occur.
The issues beyond the scope of the Court's opinion, which attracted
considerable media attention, were very troubling. The application for
a material witness warrant in al-Kidd's case did not seem to satisfy the
statutory criteria and the conditions of his confinement were deplorable, as
many of the justices observed."
A number of early commentaries on this case concluded that the Court's
concern about the underlying facts suggest that the Court will soon impose
limits on the government's power to arrest and hold material witnesses.
The rarity of material witnesses makes this conclusion seem unlikely
and, more importantly, courts are in a less than optimal position to place
constraints on material witness arrests.
8 Editorial, Qualified Immunity, Unqualified Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 2011, at A26.
9 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o85.
io Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 E3d 949, 964-65 (9 th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (201 1).
I I See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); al-Kidd, 580 E3d at 951.
12 See Qualified Immunity, Unqualfied Doubt, supra note 8; Andrew Cohen, 8-o, My Foot:
Material Witness Case Generates Material Differences, THE ATLANTIC (May 31, 2011, 12:14 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2o i/o5/8-o-my-foot-material-witness-case-
generates-material-differences/239693/; Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: Narrow Ruling
on Anti-Terrorism Tactic, SCOTUSBLOG (May 31, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2o Ii/o5/opinion-recap-narrow-ruling-on-anti-terrorism-tactic/.
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Neither the problems with the decision to arrest al-Kidd, nor the terms
of his confinement, are matters courts are well equipped to prevent in
future cases. The criteria for arrest under the Material Witness Statute are
far from clear, giving the government extraordinary power over those it
chooses to identify as witnesses. Like other vague terms, such as probable
cause, it would require a number of decisions for courts to develop criteria
placing meaningful limits on the government. Courts have further been
reluctant in the past to identify the level of custody appropriate for
detainees.13 Congress, by contrast, does not need the grist of individual
facts to develop rules. It has institutional authority to consider the nature of
criminal punishments, and by extension the terms of pre-trial and witness
confinement. Congress has developed criteria for deciding when suspects
can be detained pending trial and has delegated power to an executive
agency to assess the level of confinement appropriate for federal prisoners.
The al-Kidd case hopefully will not be the last word on the limits
on the government's power to detain material witnesses. The facts of
al-Kidd's case vividly demonstrate that it should not be. The legal issue
that brought the case into the national spotlight was, as a practical matter,
rightly decided in favor of the government notwithstanding the substantial
conflict in precedent prior to the case. The decision, expressly permitting
use of the Material Witness Statute to hold suspects, does however make
the case for limits on the statute more compelling. The government will
not have the same interest in ensuring the minimum necessary restraints
on witnesses if its goal is to pursue a case against them.
This Article will first recount the facts of the case and the basis for al-
Kidd's lawsuit against John Ashcroft. It will then describe and critique the
Ninth Circuit's opinion permitting the suit to go forward. The practically
inescapable but poorly reasoned Supreme Court's opinion will then be
considered. Finally, this Article will consider problems with the Material
Witness Statute that were not before the Court.
I. FACTS OF THE AL-KIDD CASE
On March 14, 2003, the United States Attorney's Office for the District
of Idaho asked a federal magistrate to authorize the arrest of Abdullah al-
Kidd as a material witness.14 A remarkably short and conclusory affidavit
13 While federal judges can make recommendations about the degree of confinement,
and even the location of confinement, to the Bureau of Prisons, these decisions are merely ad-
visory. SeeAdam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 195
(2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2000)). Oddly, by contrast, courts are willing to conclude
that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, regardless of the basis for imposing
them. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (finding prison overcrowding to be
an Eighth Amendment violation).
14 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (No.
io-98), 2o1 WL 5096738, at *23-24.
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supporting the application for his arrest warrant stated that he had
information "crucial" to the prosecution of Sami Omar al-Hussayen for the
offenses of visa fraud and making false statements to the United States.15
Scott Mace, a Special Agent with the FBI in Boise, Idaho, informed the
district court in this affidavit that during the course of investigating Mr. al-
Hussayen's visa and false statement offenses, "information was developed
regarding the involvement of Abdullah [a]l-Kidd."' 6 The sum total of the
"information" so discovered is related below
[F]rom March 2000 to November 2001, an individual identified
as Abdullah [a]I-Kidd, a/k/a Lavoni T Kidd, and/or his spouse,
Nadine Zegura, received payments from Sami Omar [all-
Hussayen and his associates in excess of $20,000.00. AI-Kidd
traveled to Sana'a, Yemen, in August 2001 and remained
there until April 2002, when he returned to the United States.
Upon his return to the United States, [a]l-Kidd traveled to
Moscow, Idaho, and met with [a]l-Hussayen's associates.
While in Moscow, [a]l-Kidd emptied a storage facility which
contained personal items belonging to him. Among those
personal items were documents [a]l-Kidd left behind, which
included a conference program for the second annual IANA
conference in Dearborn, Michigan, in December 1994; a hotel
receipt from Sacramento, California, dated 4/26/2001, in the
name of Abdullah [a]l-Kidd, listing his company name as "[a]
I-Multaqa;" and telephone numbers for IANA (734-528-
0006) and Basem Khafagi (734-481-1930). Khafagi is a former
Director of IANA and former University of Idaho student
(graduated in 1988) who was recently arrested in New York. 17
Many aspects of this affidavit seem insufficient. The affiant never stated
the nature of the lies al-Hussayen allegedly made to agents of the U.S.
government, or the nature of visa fraud alleged. Without this information,
it is impossible to comprehend how Abdullah al-Kidd's receipt of money
from al-Hussayen, or al-Kidd's travel to Yemen could be relevant to the
government's prosecution. The affidavit did not state what the initials
IANA abbreviated. It most likely referred to the Islamic Assembly of
North America, which was referenced in the al-Hussayen indictment, but
the meaning of these initials were never stated in the affidavit."5 Nor was
it even remotely clear how any ties al-Kidd may have had with such an
organization demonstrated his knowledge of information bearing on al-
Hussayen's prosecution for false statements and visa fraud. The affiant
15 Mace Affidavit, United States v. al-Hussayen, No. o3 -048-C-EJL (D. Idaho Mar. 14,
2003) (No. o3-048-C-EJL), 201o WL 5096738 at *64.
16 Id. at *63.
17 Id. at *63-64.
18 Certainly this seems to be a question of draftsmanship rather than substance, though
there are other possible organizations these initials could identify, including the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority or the Intermodal Association of North America.
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even identified al-Kidd only as "Kidd" in one of the paragraphs, while
referring to him as "[a]l-Kidd" in the remainder. 9
The indictment against Sami Omar al-Hussayen provides some context
to the facts in the affidavit, but does not demonstrate how al-Kidd's
testimony was relevant to the particular charges then pending against al-
Hussayen. In essence, this indictment alleged that al-Hussayen, a Saudi
national, was issued a visa to be in the United States for the sole purpose
of studying to obtain his Ph.D. in computer science at the University of
Idaho and on a number of occasions represented to agents of the U.S.
government that that was his sole purpose for being in the country. While in
the United States, however, the government alleged, he was also retained
by a number of entities to assist them with information technology and
assisted the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) with substantial
fundraising and technology. The indictment further alleged that the IANA's
website disseminated "radical Islamic ideology the purpose of which was
indoctrination, recruitment of members, and the instigation of acts of
violence and terrorism." z The indictment supported this characterization
with a reference to an article that appeared on one of the organization's
websites published by a radical Saudi sheikh in June 2001, who advocated
suicide bombings or "bringing down an airplane on an important location
that will cause the enemy great losses.121 Such stories, however, were also
posted on the BBC's website.2 1
Whether al-Hussayen's involvement in these posts amounted to
journalism, eerie prophecy, or an immediate incitement to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, there was only one question for the court
considering the government's request for a warrant to arrest al-Kidd: Did
al-Kidd have information material to the prosecution that the government
would be unable to obtain with a subpoena? And the government's case
required that it prove that al-Hussayen had been in the country for some
purpose other than his education. At most, the government alleged that
al-Kidd knew al-Hussayen, had taken money from him, and had contact
information for someone in this organization al-Hussayen was supporting.
But these facts did little to demonstrate the government's need for al-Kidd's
testimony against al-Hussayen. Was the government suggesting that al-
Kidd's testimony could be used to demonstrate the extent of al-Hussayen's
19 Mace Affidavit, supra note 15, at *64.
2o al-Hussayen Indictment, al-Hussayen, No. o3-o 4 8-C-EJL, 2oo WL 5096738 at
*73-74.
21 Id. at *75. There was a superseding indictment and al-Hussayen was ultimately ac-
quitted on all terrorism charges. For a characterization of al-Hussayen's website as reporting
news and not advocating violence, see Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privay Rights,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809 (2007) and Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under
the Material Witness Support to Terrorism Statute: Time to Fix What's Broken, ii N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. PO1'Y 365, 367-73 (zoo8).
22 See Moore, supra note 21, at 835 n.93.
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business interests? Or was his testimony to be used to demonstrate al-
Hussayen's extensive role in the Islamic Assembly of North America?
It is certainly not clear from the affidavit used to support his arrest
exactly how the government thought his testimony might be useful as it
noted only that al-Kidd "is believed to be in possession of information
germane to this matter which will be crucial to the prosecution."23 To the
extent al-Kidd's potential testimony bore on any of these matters, if it did
at all, surely his testimony was not uniquely able to establish the elements
of the crime alleged against al-Hussayen. The application further did not
mention what information the government believed al-Kidd possessed, or
how it was an essential part of the case against al-Hussayen.2 4 Whatever
information al-Kidd possessed about al-Hussayen was in fact sufficiently
trivial that al-Kidd was never summoned before a grand jury or called to
testify in al-Hussayen's trial.2 ,
There were gross omissions in the affidavit. The government's request
for a warrant to arrest al-Kidd contended that he had met with an associate
of al-Hussayen after returning from a trip to Yemen and that he had taken
$20,000 from al-Hussayen.2 6 The affidavit did not say why al-Kidd had
received this money. The affidavit did not mention that al-Kidd had a
degree in computer programming and had been compensated for his work
as an information technology specialist for the JANA.2 7
Parts of the Mace Affidavit suggest that the affiant hoped the magistrate
reviewing it would simply draw the worst possible assumption about every
Muslim entity or person identified. The affidavit did not make any effort to
identify "[all-Multaqa." It further did not state what charge led to Basem
Khafagi's recent arrest in New York, or even the municipality in New York
where Khafagi was arrested. Seemingly the government was hoping the
judge would draw a negative inference from the mere fact that a Muslim
man from Idaho, whom al-Kidd knew, was arrested in one of the two
jurisdictions al-Qaeda attacked. The reason for Khafagi's arrest, which the
affidavit did not mention, was on a charge of bank fraud. 8
For almost a century, federal courts have recognized that "bare
bones" affidavits are insufficient for warrants2 9 And notwithstanding the
23 Mace Affidavit, supra note 15, at *64.
24 See id. at *63-64; Application for Arrest Warrant of Material Witness, al-Hussayen, No.
03-048-C-EJL, 201O WL 5096738 at *59-60.
25 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *38-39.
26 Mace Affidavit, supra note 15, at *63.
27 See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *28.
28 Nicholas K. Geranios, Second Man with Ties to University of Idaho Arrested, SEATrLE
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2003 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?
date=2003o3I 4 &slug=webarrest 14-
29 E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984); see Kenneth M. Murchison,
Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471, 506-1 1 (1982). For a complete history of the evolution of the requirement
[Vol. Ioo
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extraordinary protection from civil liability given to officers possessing
arrest or search warrants, officers are not entitled to immunity for trespass,
false arrest, or civil rights actions if they rely on bare bones warrant
applications.30 No reasonable officer should have thought he could have
relied on a warrant obtained on the basis of such an application and certainly
no federal judge should have issued such a warrant.
The government's affidavit did not even claim to satisfy any particular
evidentiary threshold to justify this arrest. A warrant for an ordinary arrest
requires probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it. The Material Witness Statute does not specify
the quantum of proof the government must satisfy to obtain a warrant,
though many courts have assumed that the standard is probable cause.3
The government's bare bones affidavit failed to assert that it had probable
cause that al-Kidd was in possession of helpful information.3" It merely
concluded that al-Kidd was "believed to be in possession of information
germane to this matter which will be crucial to the prosecution.
33
Remarkably, if this standard is correct, a man's liberty turns on satisfying a
pleading requirement and nothing more.34
The facts supporting the government's conclusion that al-Kidd would
be unavailable to provide evidence against al-Hussayen were even less
substantial than the facts demonstrating that al-Kidd had "crucial"
information. The government's affidavit stated, "Kidd [sic] is scheduled
that an adequate factual allegation be offered in a warrant application, see Fabio Arcila, Jr., The
Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275 (201 o); Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches
and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 1o U. PA. J. CONST.
L. t (2007); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV.
377, 382-94 (2011 ). But see Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved
Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in "Due Process of Law"--"Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness" is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 51, 77-78
n. 12? (2010).
30 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-24; see also Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 9o6,
927-28 (1986).
31 See Donald Q. Cochran, Material Witness Detention in a Post-9/i World: Mission Creep or
Fresh Star?, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (describing the Bacon v. United States decision
as the origins of probable cause standard for the elements of the material witness law).
32 Even at the point in America's history when an affiant's mere allegation that he had
probable cause was sufficient for a warrant to issue, the affiant's failure to state the appropriate
standard of suspicion he claimed to have would render the warrant invalid. See Oliver, supra
note 29, at 386-87 (noting that in the mid-nineteenth century, an affiant's claim that he had
"probable cause to suspect" fruits of a crime could be located in certain place, or that a person
was guilty of crime, was insufficient; the affiant was required to allege that he had "probable
cause to believe" the conclusion offered was true).
33 Mace Affidavit, supra note 15, at *64.
34 Remarkably, in Bacon v. United States, 449 E2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth
Circuit held that when a witness is to be detained so that he may testify before a grand jury,
the prosecutor's "mere statement" that the witness has material testimony is sufficient to is-
sue the warrant for an arrest.
2011-20121
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to take a one-way, first class flight (costing approximately $5,000.00) to
Saudi Arabia on Sunday, March 16, 2003, at approximately 6:00 EST. He
is scheduled to fly from Dulles International Airport to JFK International
Airport in New York and then to Saudi Arabia."35 AI-Kidd actually held a
round-trip coach-class ticket to Saudi Arabia that cost $1,700.36 No note
was made of the fact that al-Kidd was an American-born citizen, not a
Saudi national returning to his home country.37 The purpose of al-Kidd's
travel to Saudi Arabia was to work on his doctorate in Islamic studies.38
Other omissions in the Mace Affidavit enhanced the false sense that
was painted of al-Kidd. The affidavit failed to mention that al-Kidd had
cooperated with all of the government's requests for information and
had never failed to respond to a communication from any government
agent.39 The affidavit failed to mention that no government agent had
communicated with al-Kidd for six months before the request was made
for his arrest warrant.4° No mention was made of the fact that no agent of
the United States government had ever asked this cooperative American
citizen to alert the government about overseas travel or to remain available
in the country in the event that information he may have possessed became
immediately important.41
Eight FBI agents seized al-Kidd in the Dulles International Airport on
the material witness warrant. 4 Agents interviewed him one to two hours
after his arrest and told him that if he cooperated, "the matter might be
resolved quickly and he could continue on his flight. '43 He agreed to talk
and was asked about his religious faith, his conversion to Islam, and his
travel plans.' Much as he had done before, he answered all the questioned
posed to him. 4 He was then held in Alexandria Detention Center in a
high-security unit, reportedly in the same cells where John Walker Lindh
and Zacarias Moussaoui had been held.' Three days later, he appeared
before a federal magistrate judge who recommended he waive a hearing
until he could be transported back to Idaho, where "people were more
35 Mace Affidavit, supra note 15, at *64.
36 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *25.
37 Id. at 16.
38 Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Appeal over Liability for Detention, N.Y. TIM ES, Oct. i8,
2610, http:llwww.nytimes.com/zo io o/i9/us/i9scotus.html.
39 See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *16.
40 Id.
41 Id. at *16-17.
42 Id. at *29.
43 Id. at *30.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at *31.
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familiar with his case."47 He agreed with the judge's recommendation and
two weeks of hell followed.
Despite assurances by the judge that he would be quickly transported
back to Idaho, he was detained in Alexandria for nine more days.48 While
detained in Alexandria, he was held in single-person cell 22 to 23 hours a
day, with a food slot'providing him the only access to light outside his cell.49
Other inmates on this wing of the facility had glass plates on their cells, s°
making their cells considerably less claustrophobic.
He was. then transported to a federal detention center aboard an
aircraft designed for the transportation of high-risk prisoners.5 Once at the
Oklahoma Federal Transfer Center, he was forced to sit naked, in view of
other inmates who were being processed as well as male and female guards,
before he was processed and given a cell in a high-security wing of the
facility.5"
The following day, he was placed on another similar flight to be
transported to Boise, Idaho. 3 Other prisoners on the flight were permitted
to have their handcuffs loosened, but al-Kidd was not, even though this
degree of restraint prevented him from using the restroom.5 4 An officer on
the flight explained that this would not be permitted because al-Kidd's
case was "special. ' 55 Indeed his case was special. He may have been the
only detainee on board who was neither convicted of, nor even charged
with, a violation of any criminal ordinance.56
In Idaho, he met briefly with a federal public defender before an
appearance before a federal magistrate.57 The government requested
a three-day continuance and asked that bail be denied pending this
continuance on the basis that al-Kidd was a flight risk and danger to the
47 Id. at *32.
48 Id.
49 Seeid. at *31-32.
50 See id.
51 See id. at *33-34. This method of transporting prisoners was made popular in the
movie Con Air (Touchstone Pictures 1997), which was specifically mentioned in al-Kidd's
Complaint. Id. at 33.
52 Id. at *34.
53 Id. at *35.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id. at *34.
57 Id. at *35-
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community.5 8 The judge granted a two-day continuance and denied bail
during this period. s9
Despite the precautions the government deemed necessary to prevent
his escape or violence to the community, when at-Kidd's case was then
heard sixteen days after his arrest, the judge released him with relatively
few restrictions. 60 He was released into the custody of his wife, required
to surrender his passport and regularly report to a probation officer.61 His
travel was further restricted to four states. 6
The government went to trial against Sami Omar al-Hussayen for the
visa and misrepresentation charges as well as providing material support to a
foreign terrorist organization; the latter charge was alleged in a superseding
indictment following al-Kidd's arrest. 63 AI-Kidd was never subsequently
interviewed about al-Hussayen, was never called to appear before a
grand jury investigating al-Hussayen and was not called to testify at the
criminal trial against al-Hussayen. 64 A federal jury acquitted Sami Omar al-
Hussayen of the material support charges and could not reach a verdict on
the allegations of visa fraud and mis-statements to the government. 6 The
government decided not to retry him but never sought to end the restrictions
placed on al-Kidd, who had cooperated whenever requested who had been
treated like the worst of criminals.6 A1-Kidd told Adam Liptak of the New
York Times that he had been detained in harsher conditions than anyone he
encountered except one prisoner under sentence of death in Oklahoma.67
II. THE RARELY USED FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE
From the very outset, for someone lacking extraordinary familiarity
with the criminal justice system, even the authorization to arrest al-Kidd
58 Id. at *35-36. The Bail Reform Act as codified in I8 U.S.C. § 3143 (2006) permits
pretrial detention of suspects and witnesses on the basis of both flight risk and risk to the
community. In United States v. Awadallah, 349 F3d 42, 63 n.15 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second,
Circuit concluded in dicta that the risk to the community was an inappropriate basis for hold-
ing a material witness. As addressed infra note 74 and accompanying text, it is not clear why
a prediction of future dangerousness is any more problematic as a basis for holding witnesses
than it is as a basis for holding suspects.
59 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *36.
60 See id. at *38.
6I Id.
62 Id.
63 See id. at *28, *38; see also Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign
Polity, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 581 (20 11) (describing al-Hussaven's prosecution).
64 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *38-39.
65 Id. at *38.
66 Id. at *38-39.
67 See Adam Liptak, Jailed as a Material Witness but TreatedLike a Terrorist, a Lawsuit Says,
N. Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2011, at A I2.
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likely seems outrageous. At a basic level, the idea that a person can be held
because he or she possesses information helpful to the government seems
contrary to basic principles of our criminal justice system. For those with a
somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the criminal justice system
(or even the mental health system), the existence of such a statute may
seem less problematic, even if this application seems like an absurdity.
The federal standard for arresting a material witness appears in the Bail
Reform Act of 1984:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony
of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown
that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the
person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of
the person ... No material witness may be detained because of
inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony
of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if
further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.
Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable
period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.68
The statute provides no opportunity for the witness to be heard before
his arrest. Once he is arrested, the statute then directs the judicial officer to
consider the terms of the witness's release, referring the judge to the statute
relating to the "[rielease or detention of a defendant pending trial."69 This
provision requires the consideration of factors about a defendant's criminal
history, employment, and ties to the community to determine the terms
under which the defendant may be released, so that his presence at trial is
ensured.70
These factors would also be relevant to determining how likely a
witness is to appear for trial. The bail statute contains a controversial basis
for detaining defendants pending trial, which seemingly would apply
to witnesses as well. A judge is directed to determine- the "condition or
combination of conditions [that] will reasonably assure the appearance of
the person in court and the safety of any other person and the community."'"
Using the possibility of a defendant's future violence to detain him pending
trial was controversial when it was first implemented as a basis for holding
those suspected of crimes.7" Uncharged conduct - even worse, conduct
never committed - became a basis for detention when the Bail Reform
68 I8 U.S.C. § 3144 (2oo6).
69 Id § 3142.
70 See Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, PretrialRisk Assessment in the Federal Court, 73
FED. PROBATION 3, 4-5 (2009) (discussing factors courts are to consider in evaluating conditions
of release for individuals charged with a crime).
71 Id. at 6.
72 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-50 (1987); Judy Clarke, After Salerno:
How to Avoid Pretrial Detention, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1987, at 20.
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Act was passed in 1984.13 The Material Witness Statute, by instructing a
judge to consider the factors relevant to a criminal defendant's release,
permits the detention of witnesses on the basis of predictions of their future
dangerousness.
7 4
The unusual nature of this power to detain witnesses is due in no small
part to the fact that use of the power is unusual. It is very rarely used and
typically only against foreign nationals in immigration cases where the
government has a host of mechanisms for detaining the witness."
The power of the government to hold individuals for reasons other
than conviction of a crime is, however, not unique to material witnesses.
A variety of societal interests permit detentions for reasons other than
criminal punishment. Criminal suspects can, of course, be detained without
a criminal conviction if no terms of their release can ensure that they will
appear for trial, or if no terms of their release will ensure the safety of the
public.76 The mentally disturbed who present a danger to themselves or
others may be involuntarily committed.77 Those with certain communicable
medical conditions may be quarantined against their will.7
73 See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510,512 (1986); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim,
Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 335 (I990); Michael Louis Corrado,
Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 85-87 (20o5).
74 In Salerno, the Second Circuit held that future dangerousness was not an appropriate
basis for detaining a material witness. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 744. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion affirming the constitutionality of future dangerousness as a basis for pretrial detention
certainly did not consider material witnesses. The majority in Salerno reasoned that pretrial
detention was not punishment at all and that predictions of future dangerousness were con-
sistent with a variety of detentions, including the detention of the mentally disturbed. Id. at
746-47. Justice Marshall's dissent noted that the majority's reasoning authorizing preventive
detention did not depend on a criminal charge at all. Id. at 763-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75 Only 3.6% of all arrests by federal law enforcement officers were of material witnesses,
and, of those, 92.3% were foreign nationals involved in smuggling aliens to delay their removal
so they would be available to testify. AI-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 E3d 949,966 n. 16 (9th Cir. 2009).
76 Sex offenders may be confined at the end of their sentences if they present a risk
of recidivism. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350-58 (1997) (rejecting due process
challenge to civil commitment of sexual predators who pose danger to themselves or the
community).
77 See Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions in Civil
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29,38 n.192 (2003); Christopher Slobogin,An Endto Insanity:
Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1246 n. 172 (zooo).
But see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (noting that involuntary confinement
of a mentally ill person violates due process if the person poses no danger to himself or others).
78 See John Thomas Clarkson, Phase Six Pandemic: A Call to Re-evaluate Federal Quarantine
Authority Before the Next Catastrophic Outbreak, 44 GA. L. REV. 803, 816-17 (2010); Michelle A.
Daubert, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty Through a Continuum
of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1299, 1353 (2007).
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The court's power to compel an unwilling witness to testify provides
an even closer analogy to material witness detentions. 9 Material witness
detentions involve the government's power to hold a witness who prefers
to prevent a court from hearing his testimony by being elsewhere when
his testimony is required. Rarely does a court take the unusual step of
ensuring the witness's presence by incarcerating him, because prosecutors
infrequently request such detentions. Far more frequently a witness -
often a reporter - will comply with a subpoena but be unwilling to divulge
requested information. In such cases, courts can, and frequently do, place
the witness in jail until he or she cooperates. 0
By contrast, material witness detentions provide the government a
mechanism to ensure the testimony of those who attempt to avoid testifying
by absenting themselves from the proceedings altogether. Conceptually,
the existence of such a power is not as unusual as it may seem and has
a long historical pedigree, even if it has been mostly a dormant power.81
Since the earliest days of the country's existence, Congress and many
state legislatures have given courts the power to detain witnesses whose
testimony is important to a criminal case if there are doubts about the
willingness of the witness to voluntarily appear.8" Under federal law, if
a judge is satisfied that a witness's testimony is "material" to a criminal
prosecution and it would be "impracticable" to ensure the witness's
presence by a subpoena, the witness may be placed under whatever degree
of restraint the judge finds necessary to ensure his presence.'
Another use of this power was recently discovered, or to be more precise,
re-discovered. 84 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the Justice Department
would use material witness warrants to hold terrorist suspects when the
government lacked adequate suspicion to charge them with crimes.8" It
79 See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1043-44 (zo )
(describing the circumstances under which reporters may be jailed for refusing to reveal their
sources).
8o See RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception and Legal Protection
in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 341 (2oo9) (observing the
increased use of subpoenas for reporters in 2002).
81 See Stacey M. Stud nicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The History
and Future of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 483, 487-92 (2002) (discussing the
history of the material witness detention power).
8z See Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served orDenied?, 40 WAYNE
L. REV. 1533, 1539-42 (1994) (describing history of material witness law in Michigan); Carolyn
B. Ramsey, In the Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the Detention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 681, 69o-92 (2009) (describing the history of material witness law in Illinois);
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention in Nineteenth Century New
York, i N.YU. J.L. & LIBERTY 727 (2005) (describing New York's material witness law).
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2nn6).
84 See infra note 2o5-o6 and accompanying text.
85 This was part of a reorientation of the Department of Justice - the department's pri-
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seems to be beyond question that a material witness warrant was sought
against al-Kidd because of the government's suspicions of his wrongdoing.
In testimony before Congress, FBI Director Robert Mueller described the
progress of his bureau after September 1 1.86 He first described the arrest of
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11
attacks." Abdullah al-Kidd was his second example followed by a number
of defendants who had been arrested on criminal charges.88 Mueller never
noted in his testimony that al-Kidd had been arrested as a witness against
another, not as a suspect himself.8 9
Civil libertarians critical of many aspects of the Bush Administration's
tactics in the new war on terror immediately objected that the Material
Witness Statute was not intended as a means of preventive detention.9 °
Their arguments looked to the terms of the statute itself. The government's
right to arrest a material witness is certainly triggered by his possession of
information helpful to the government, not his criminal acts or anticipated
criminal acts. The Administration's critics, however, never provided an
answer to a difficult question raised by their thesis. Could the government
be denied the right to hold a witness with information material to a
criminal prosecution, whose presence could not be secured by subpoena, if
the government also suspected the witness of wrongdoing himself? Does
the government somehow have less ability to hold such a witness when
the witness himself is also believed to be involved in acts that threaten
widespread destruction?
mary goal was becoming preventing rather than punishing crime. Jules Lobel, The Preventive
Paradigm and the Perils ofAdHocBalancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. I407, 14o8 (2007); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SHIFTING FROM PROSECUTION TO PREVENTION, REDESIGNING THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS OF TERRORISM (2O02), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/aooa/fbireorganizationfactsheet.htm.
86 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *37.
87 Id.
88 Id. It seems doubtful Mueller was suggesting that al-Kidd was the second most im-
portant arrest in the War on Terror. It seems far more likely that al-Kidd's name was alpha-
betically the first in a list of persons deemed less significant than Khalid Shaik Mohammed.
See Hearing on Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 2004, Part 6 Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, Io8th Cong. 91 (2003)
(statement of Robert Mueller, Dir., FBI).
89 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *37.
90 See Nan Aron, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd: Immunity for the Shameless?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
27, 20io), http:/www.huffingtonpost.comlnan-aronlashcroft-v-al-kidd-immuni-b_77464.
html; Laurie Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & the War on Terrorism, 35 Lov. L.A. L.
REV. 1217, 1222-23 (2ooz) ("When America adopted into its laws the power to detain material
witnesses, the focus of the law was on having an individual available to testify in a criminal
proceeding."); Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration
Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1 173, 1200 (2004) (citing arguments that "the government has manip-
ulated the material witness provisions, like the immigration statutes, to hold those it suspects
of terrorist activities but for whom it does not have the probable cause necessary to support a
criminal detention").
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III. NINTH CIRCUIT FOUND INNOCENCE A PRE-REQUISITE TO INCARCERATION
Abdullah al-Kidd's case presented the first opportunity to test the
theory that material witness detentions could not be used to hold criminal
suspects. Interestingly, the theory of recovery against John Ashcroft in
his complaint was not based on the idea that pretextual uses of material
witness detentions violate the Fourth Amendment. AI-Kidd contended in
the complaint that John Ashcroft created a policy of using material witness
detentions to hold suspects, which set in motion the actions of the FBI
agents in this case to seek the detention of a "witness" whose potential
testimony was not material and whose appearance could have easily been
secured with a subpoena.9' Stated another way, al-Kidd contended that
Ashcroft highly incentivized the use of material witness detentions as a
means of holding suspects for whom the government lacked adequate
suspicion to charge and then failed to ensure that prosecutors were only
seeking to arrest those witnesses who fit the criteria of the Material Witness
Statute. The Ninth Circuit used the case to announce a considerably more
sweeping and specious proposition-that innocence is a pre-requisite to
the detention of material witnesses.92
AI-Kidd brought a civil rights action against a number of people
involved in his unfortunate detention, including those who filed the
incomplete and false affidavits in support of his arrest warrant and those
who determined that his degree of custody should be comparable to that of
death-row inmates.93 He also filed suit against then-Attorney General John
Ashcroft, alleging that Ashcroft had set in motion a chain of events that
allowed a perfectly law-abiding American citizen, indeed an all-American
college football player, whose only sin appeared to have been his sincere
conversion to Islam, to be treated like a hardened criminal. 4 In the factual
allegations in the complaint, al-Kidd stated that it was unreasonable to use
a statute designed to ensure the presence of a witness to hold a suspect
whom law enforcement officials lacked evidence to charge with a crime.95
91 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *39-41.
92 See Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F3d 949, 970 (2009).
93 See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at * 18-2 I
(identifying parties).
94 Id. at *39-41, *44-50.
95 Id. at *39-40 ("[Tlhe government used the [material witness] statute as a pretext to
arrest and hold individuals whom the government lacked probable cause to charge with a
crime but nonetheless wished to detain preventively and/or to investigate for possible crimi-
nal wrongdoing.... Pursuant to this new, unlawful use of the Justice Department's material
witness powers, Defendants' purpose in arresting and detaining Mr. al-Kidd was not to secure
his testimony, but to preventively hold and investigate him for possible criminal wrongdoing.
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The portion of the complaint that stated claims for relief, however, had a
somewhat narrower basis for relief (for violation of the Fourth Amendment):
Mr. al-Kidd's arrest, detention and post-release conditions
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because, inter alia, (a) he was arrested for the
unlawful purpose of detaining him preventively and/or for
further investigation, and not because his testimony was needed;
(b) because there was no probable cause to believe his testimony
could not be secured without arrest; (c) because there was no
probable cause to believe Mr. al-Kidd had testimony germane to
a criminal proceeding; (d) because of the prolonged, excessive,
and punitive conditions of Mr. al-Kidd's detention and post-
release terms; and (e) because of Defendants' unreasonable and
unlawful searches, including strip searches. 6
AI-Kidd offered a nearly identical claim against the various defendants
in this case for violating the terms of Material Witness Statute:
Mr. al-Kidd's arrest, detention and post-detention release
conditions violated the Material Witness Statute because, inter
alia, (a) he was arrested for the unlawful purpose of detaining him
preventively and/or for further investigation, and not because
his testimony was needed; (b) because there was no probable
cause to believe his testimony could not be secured without
arrest; (c) because there was no probable cause to believe Mr.
al-Kidd had testimony germane to a criminal proceeding; and
(d) because of the prolonged, excessive, and punitive conditions
of Mr. al-Kidd's detention and post-release terms. 9'
AI-Kidd's claim was, in essence, that Ashcroft created conditions that
were ripe for "witnesses" whom the government suspected of terrorist
activities to be detained even though the conditions of the Material
Witness Statute were not satisfied. Al-Kidd contended that Ashcroft's
"unlawful" policy of using material witness detentions to hold suspects
created this risk.98 The separate counts in the complaint seemed to do no
more than offer different authority to demonstrate why the actions of the
former Attorney General were illegal.
The district court held that on the basis of the pleadings, Ashcroft was
not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.99 Its memorandum order
stated al-Kidd's basis for Ashcroft's liability as follows:
96 Id. at *52.
97 Id. at *51-52.
98 Even though the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the pretextual use of material
witness detentions did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it seems that al-Kidd's argument
that Ashcroft failed to take measures to ensure witnesses were not detained without a suf-
ficient basis survived the Supreme Court's decision. See discussion at infra note 188-95 and
accompanying text.
99 Memorandum Order, Ashcroft v. Gonzales, 2oo6 WL 542957o , at *9.
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[T]he claims against Mr. Ashcroft contend that he spear-headed
the post-September 11, 2001 practice of the Department of
Justice to use the material witness statute to detain individuals
whom they sought to investigate but had not charged with a
crime.100
The debate in the trial court focused on whether al-Kidd had
sufficiently made a claim for which Ashcroft bore responsibility for a
warrant being issued for his arrest when neither.the materiality of al-Kidd's
testimony nor his feared unavailability for trial had been demonstrated
in the application for the warrant. 10 ' The Supreme Court's decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal requires more than an allegation that a government
official had a supervisory role over an offending official to be liable.102
One of the most difficult hurdles al-Kidd faced was demonstrating a
sufficient, causal link between the wholly inadequate application for al-
Kidd's arrest and the policies of Ashcroft under the Iqbal standard. The
Justice Department argued in the district court that "the vague and
conclusory allegations in the complaint allege nothing more than a claim
against Mr. Ashcroft based upon his supervisory status but not upon his
actual personal involvement."1 3 The district court found the complaint
"sufficient ... to raise a claim for relief against Mr. Ashcroft as to his
involvement in the constitutional violations allegedly incurred by Mr.
al-Kidd."'  The district court did not even address the pretext issue that
took this case to the Supreme Court, namely that Ashcroft could be liable
for damages if the facts alleged in the Mace Affidavit were sufficient for a
material witness warrant.
Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that this was a valid
claim against Ashcroft.' The court recognized that two recent Supreme
Court cases, Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, required
some degree of specificity in the allegation that Ashcroft had a role in a
warrant being sought when the requirements for such warrants had not
been satisfied.' °6 The court found that al-Kidd offered more than "bare
allegations" that Ashcroft layed role in his allegedly baseless arrest."7 Al-
Kidd asserted in his complaint that Ashcroft made statements concluding
that the "[aiggressive detention of . . .material witnesses [was] vital to
too Id. at-*4.
ioi Id. at *9 ("Mr. al-Kidd's allegations are that probable cause as not shown in the
warrant application and, therefore, his constitutional rights were violated.").
102 See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of CivilProcedure, 6o DUKE L.J. i, 19 (2010).
103 Memorandum Order, supra note 99, at *9.
104 Id.
105 AI-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 E3d 949, 98 1 (9th Cir. 2oo9).
106 Id. at 974-77.
107 Id. at 975.
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preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks."'10 8 Al-Kidd alleged that
nearly 50% of those detained as witnesses in the wake of September 11
were never called to testify."°9 Finally, al-Kidd alleged that the attorney
general should have been on notice of detentions of persons who did not
satisfy the statutory requirements because of extensive media coverage
of abuses of the Material Witness Statute following September 11.110
The court found that this claim stated a cause of action against Ashcroft
"independent of the constitutionality of [the Material Witness Statute] for
investigatory purposes....
The court also concluded that al-Kidd raised a much more abstract
claim, the claim that ultimately found its way to the Supreme Court. In
his brief to the Ninth Circuit, Ashcroft argued that his policy on material
witness detentions could not be unconstitutional as any material witness
arrest that satisfied the terms of the statute was objectively reasonable."'
Represented by the Justice Department, he contended that, "[elven
if former Attorney General Ashcroft instituted a policy requiring the
pretextual use of material witness warrants to investigate terrorist suspects,
as plaintiff alleges, the subjective motivation alleged does not render the
policy unconstitutional[.]"" '3
AI-Kidd's response to Ashcroft's argument reframed the issue the Ninth
Circuit was considering. To negate Ashcroft's argument that his policies
were irrelevant, al-Kidd made a very broad claim that the Ninth Circuit
would embrace without qualification:
If defendant's policy were upheld, it would allow the government
to do an end-run around the Fourth Amendment. Rather than
arresting an individual only afteran investigation has established
probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, the government would
now be able to arrest that individual and then investigate for
possible criminal wrongdoing." 4
The Ninth Circuit then characterized al-Kidd's Fourth Amendment
claim in the following terms:
[A]l-Kidd alleges that Ashcroft designed and implemented a
policy under which the FBI and DOJ would arrest individuals
who may have met the facial statutory requirements of [the
io8 Id. (quoting John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Attorney GeneralAshcroft Outlines Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.usog.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2ol i/agcrisisremarks io.o3 j.htm).
io9 Id.
i I o Id. at 976.
111 Id. at 973.
11z Appellee's Opposition Brief, at 21, al-Kidd, 580 E3d 949 (No. o6-36o59), 2007 WL
2063598.
113 Id.
114 Id. at *22.
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Material Witness Statute], but with the ulterior and allegedly
unconstitutional purpose of investigating or preemptively
detaining them, in violation of the Fourth Amendment...."'
Addressing this issue, Ashcroft claimed material witness detentions
should be viewed like any other arrest based on probable cause." 6 Whren v.
United States, the paradigm case Ashcroft offered, held that an officer's basis
for stopping a motorist was irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to
believe the motorist had committed a traffic offense." 7 Al-Kidd contended
that the reason for a seizure was relevant whenever the government did
not have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal wrongdoing."' 8 City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, the paradigm case al-Kidd offered, held that cars
could not be randomly seized at a roadblock to check for drugs."9 The
Ninth Circuit would find that Edmond controlled.2 0 The Supreme Court
would reverse, finding that Whren controlled. 2' The facts of al-Kidd,
however, neatly fit within neither paradigm.
Most often, as long as there is a legitimate basis for a search or seizure, the
real reason the government agent acted is irrelevant.' 2 Minor speeders, for
instance, can be stopped amid of sea of reckless drivers even if the officer's
motivation for the stop was an unsupportable hunch that the driver was
transporting drugs. In the traffic stop example, however, several motorists
were guilty of criminal wrongdoing, admittedly in varying degrees.'23 Once
there is an adequate factual basis to believe that a particular individual
has engaged in wrongdoing, it does not matter that the government acted
because it suspected more serious wrongdoing but lacked the evidence to
demonstrate it.'24 Of course detaining someone the government suspected
of terrorism does not easily fit into this paradigm. There is nothing
inherently wrong about possessing information helpful to the government,
even in a terrorism prosecution.
The Ninth Circuit therefore drew on a different line of Fourth
Amendment cases. The government is allowed to engage in certain types
of searches or seizures of persons whom it has no basis to suspect of
115 al-Kidd, 580 E3d at 957.
1I6 See id. at 966.
117 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 811 (1996).
iI8 See al-Kidd, 580 E3d at 968.
i11 Id. at 968-69 (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45-47 (2000)).
12o al-Kidd, 580 F3d at 968.
121 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2o82 (20 1 ).
122 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) ("With the limited exception of
some special needs and administrative search cases, '[the Court] ha[s] been unwilling to en-
tertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers."'
(citation omitted) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 813)).
123 See Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-i9.
124 See id.
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criminal activity, so long as the real reason for the seizure is not to explore
the possibility of criminal activity. Often these searches are identified as
"special needs" searches or seizures, where the purpose of the government's
action is something "other than that of traditional law enforcement." '
Motives matter in this line of cases. Roadblocks that stop every driver,16 or
every tenth driver,' are permitted to ensure that motorists are insured," 8
so long as the actual purpose is not to run a dog around the car to check
if the motorist is transporting drugs.2 9 Such roadblocks are acceptable to
protect highways from drunk drivers or to ensure that all motorists are
licensed. 3 ' Railroad workers can be randomly drug tested if the motives
of the investigators are to ensure the safety of the railroad, but not if their
purpose is to investigate the crime of drug possession.' 3'
The "special needs" cases similarly do not provide a ready analogy to
the detention of material witnesses. The witness's seizure and detention is
far from random. The witness is uniquely identified because of information
he possesses, yet his possession of the material information does not equate
to wrongdoing. Does the government's selection process that uniquely
identifies a specific person to be detained for a legitimate reason other
than criminal investigation make the government's use of this device to
investigate crime irrelevant? Or must there be evidence providing probable
cause of guilt before the government's motivation becomes irrelevant?
The Ninth Circuit found witness detentions to be more analogous to
special needs seizures and held that to seize a witness without suspicion
of wrongdoing the purpose must be for something other than pursuing
a criminal case against him.132 The court found that material witness
detentions for the purpose of holding criminal suspects bypassed the
125 Ric Simmons, Search for Terrorists: Why Public Safety is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J.
843, 889-9o (2oio).
126 See Delaware v. Prouse, 44o U.S. 648, 656-58 (1979) ("For Fourth Amendment purpos-
es, [the Court saw] insufficient resemblance between sporadic and random stops of individual
vehicles making their way through city traffic and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where
all vehicles are brought to a halt .. " (emphasis added)).
127 See id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The roadblock stop for all traffic is given as
an example [by the majority]. I necessarily assume that the Court's reservation also includes
other not purely random stops (such as every ioth car to pass a given point) that equate with,
but are less intrusive than, a zoo% roadblock stop.").
128 See id. at 657-59 (majority opinion).
129 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-42 (2000) ("The fact that officers
walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis check-
points does not transform the seizure into a search," but "[blecause the primary purpose of
the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment." (emphasis added)).
i3o See Prouse, 44o U.S. at 657-58.
13i See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 6oz, 620-2I (1989).
132 A1-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 E3d 949, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Fourth Amendment's requirement that the government have probable
cause to seize and hold a criminal suspect. 33
The Ninth Circuit made a choice between two competing paradigms of
legal authority, neither of which provided a complete analogy to the power
of the government to arrest witnesses. Ashcroft argued that under Whren,
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis." '134 The Ninth Circuit quite correctly observed that
the issue was far more complicated than Ashcroft suggested. "[A]rrests of
material witnesses are neither 'ordinary,' nor involve 'probable cause' as that
term has historically been understood," Judge Milam Smith concluded 35
"Whren rejected only the proposition that 'ulterior motives can invalidate
police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that
a violation of law has occurred." 36
. The Court reasoned that if the arrest is objectively justified by evidence
of the detainee's wrongdoing, then the actual reason for the seizure is
irrelevant. 137 If, however, the government offers a basis other than the
detainee's wrongdoing for seizing him, then the government's motive for
seizing him is relevant.'38 Once it decided that material witness detentions
fit better within the "special needs" line of cases, the Ninth Circuit
mechanically applied the Supreme Court's precedent to conclude that the
government's interest in conducting a criminal investigation negated the
legitimacy of the detention.'39 In the view of the Ninth Circuit, al-Kidd
had adequately alleged that the purpose of this detention was a criminal
investigation and the seizure, justified on a basis other than al-Kidd's
wrongdoing, violated the Fourth Amendment. 4
Viewing the legal doctrines in isolation, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
seems to have been one of two reasonable paths before it. A strong argument
can indeed be made that the Ninth Circuit picked the more analogous
strain of authority. Looking at the practical impact of choosing the Ninth
Circuit's path makes its choice considerably more questionable. Regardless
of whether the government suspected the witness of criminal activity, his
detention was bypassing any consideration of whether there was probable
cause of his wrongdoing. Typically, the government's "special need"
permits only minor intrusions - certainly when the intrusion is a seizure of
the person. The Supreme Court noted that seizures at roadblocks involved
133 Id. at 972.
134 Id. at 966 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996)).
135 Id.
136 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 8 11).
137 Id. at 966 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 8 1).
138 Id. at 968-69 (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,44 (2000)).
39 Id. at 971-73.
14o Id. at 975.
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a "brief' and "slight" intrusion.1 41 The Court has recognized that the
government's interest in officer safety permits officers to order passengers
out of stopped automobiles, but the Court observed that the intrusion
was "de minimis."'' 41 The Supreme Court has recognized that, by contrast,
arrests are substantial intrusions.'43 The facts of al-Kidd's case certainly
do nothing to undermine this conclusion. Either the Ninth Circuit was
giving the government considerable power to impose on its citizens once
a "special need" was demonstrated, or it left out a very substantial part of
its conclusions. If the interest in securing witnesses is viewed like other
special needs, then only a de minimis intrusion on a citizen's liberty is
permitted to vindicate it.
On a more practical level, choosing the line of authority that made the
government's motivation for the detention relevant left a very puzzling
result. A witness the government suspected of no wrongdoing could be
detained. A witness the government suspected of membership in al-Qaeda
must be left at large until adequate suspicion existed to charge him with
a crime. Innocence was thus a pre-requisite to arrest and detention as a
material witness.
The difficulty with the Ninth Circuit's analysis did not end there. As this
was a civil rights action against John Ashcroft in his individual capacity, al-
Kidd faced another hurdle. He was required to show that the constitutional
prohibition on using material witness detentions to hold criminal suspects
was "clearly established." To ensure that government actors are not afraid
to do their jobs, federal civil rights laws have long provided that officials
are only civilly liable for actions that they should be aware violate either
constitutional or statutory provisions.'" The Ninth Circuit offered two
separate justifications for its conclusion that Ashcroft should have been
aware that this use of the federal material witness detention statute violated
the Fourth Amendment.
First, the court opined, it was patently obvious that the statute was not
intended to be used as a mechanism to hold suspects.' 45 No case at the time
the warrant was issued in this case had found that such use of the material
witness detention statute was contrary to the Fourth Amendment, but the
court reasoned that no court would have had an opportunity to rule on such
use of the detentions. 146 Without offering any citation, the court made the
remarkable (and incorrect) historical claim that such use of the detentions
141 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,451-52 (1990).
142 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,412 (1997).
143 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 581 (198o).
144 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 1 IO YALE L.J. 259, 269-70
(2ooo) (explaining basis for qualified immunity is fear of over-deterrence).
145 al-Kidd, 580 F3 d at 965-67.
146 Id. at 970-7 1.
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was so patently contrary to the Constitution that the detentions of suspects
under Material Witness Statutes had never previously been attempted. 1
Even without historical evidence to the contrary, it would be hard to
accept the court's conclusion that no governmental actor prior to Ashcroft
had discovered that Material Witness Statutes provided a mechanism to
detain a suspect while a case was worked up against him.148 But historical
evidence to the contrary abounded and the Ninth Circuit was aware of
it.' 49 The court cited to thi's author's work on the history of material witness
detentions for the proposition that material witness detentions began to
occur only in the 1840s.1s° The court then missed the main thrust of the
article it cited: That material witness detentions have always been used to
hold suspects prosecutors lacked adequate suspicion to charge.
Historical acceptance of material witness detentions actually depended
on them being used in the manner the Ninth Circuit found to be
clearly unconstitutional.' While material witness detentions occur very
infrequently in modern times, they were quite common in a number of
American cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.'
Objections were made to the practice in general and to the detention of
innocent bystanders in particular - exactly the type of witnesses the Ninth
Circuit found it constitutionally acceptable to detain.
The practice of detaining witnesses occurred so frequently between
1850 and 1930 as to provide a very complete picture of the reasons for the
detentions and the public's acceptance of the practice. In New York City,
the practice was so common that high-profile public figures and interest
groups came to publicly oppose the practice over several decades, prompting
a series of reforms. 3 A substantial piece of evidence demonstrating the
frequency of this practice is seen in the facility holding witnesses. In 1857,
the City created a separate facility, the House of Detention for Witnesses,
147 Id. at 970.
148 See Donald Q. Cochran, Material Witness Detention in a Post-9/ls World: Mission Creep
or Fresh Start?, I8 Go. MASON L. REV. 1, 15 (2010) ("As to the allegation that the line be-
tween witness and suspect has been blurred by post-9l i policy, it is not at all clear that such
a line ever existed or should exist."). A number of academic commentators in the wake of
September i i concluded that the material witness detention statute could not be used to
hold criminal suspects. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson, Distorting Due Processfor Noble Purposes: The
Emasculation of America's Material Witness Laws, 42 GA. L. REV. 941,972 (zoo8); see also sources
cited at supra note 75.
149 al-Kidd, 580 E3d at 959.
150 Id. (citing Oliver, supra note 8z).
151 See BriefofAmicus Curiae Wesley MacNeil Oliver in Support of the Petitioner at 4-5,
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 10-98), 20 10 WL 5125442.
152 See Oliver, supra note 82, at 728 n. i; Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the Sweat Box: A Historical
Perspective on the Detention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRlM. L. 681, 708-09 (2009).
153 Oliver, supra note 82, at 780.
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so that those held would not languish in the same condition as pre-trial
detainees and convicted misdemeanants.M
The conditions of confinement had not been the sole, or even
primary, concern of reformers who objected to the practice of material
witness detentions in the second half of the nineteenth century. 55 While
many reformers thought that the possession of information helpful to a
prosecution should not provide a legal basis for detaining anyone, all
reformers focused on tales of innocent persons held to testify against
criminal suspects.'56 Some reformers even expressly recognized that their
concern was for the bystander alone, and they would permit the detentions
of those "witnesses" suspected of involvement with the defendant against
whom they were held to testify.'57
A cartoon from Harper's Weekly from 1881 clearly demonstrates the
primary concern of those reformers in New York who fought to end, or at
least limit, the power of the state to hold witnesses. 5 8 The cartoon shows
an innocent witness in the House of Detention for Witnesses while the
defendant against whom he is to testify is in a tavern boastfully displaying
a paper reporting that he is out on bond. By 1883, New York revised its law
relating to material witnesses, limiting the power of magistrates to order the
detention of those witnesses suspected of complicity in the crimes about
which they allegedly had information.15 9 The number of persons held in
the House of Detention for Witnesses did not precipitously.drop after the
legislature permitted only the detention of suspect-witnesses, revealing
that a considerable number of those witnesses detained prior to 1883 were
also suspected of criminal activity.6
154 See id. at 753-54.
155 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wesley MacNeil Oliver, supra note I5o, at 7-8 (arguing that
innocent detainees were the primary concern of reformers).
S6 Id. at 7.
157 See Oliver, supra note 8z, at 744-45.
158 Id. at 778.
i59 See id. at 779-
16o Id. at 761-62 (showing that detentions numbered 408 in 1882, 228 in 1883, 286 in
1884, and 328 in 1885).
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Figure One: An Unjust Law. Harper's Weekly, April 9, 1881 at 228. The caption notes "The
Innocent Witness Detained as a Prisoner, whilst the Criminal Goes Free."
The unique concern for innocent detainees continued into the twentieth
century. After New York dropped its requirement that detained witnesses
also be suspected of wrongdoing themselves, an association of grand
jurors in 1930 complained about the treatment of innocent detainees.16" '
The group expressly noted that it felt no sympathy with those somehow
involved with defendants, even if the witness was merely suspected of
being a member of the same criminal organization as the defendant against
whom he was to testify.1 62
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on history was thus backwards in two
important respects. Not only were material witnesses used as a pretext to
hold suspects prior to September 11, 2001, historically this appears to have
been the most frequent use of such detentions. Additionally, the public
was very much aware of, and indeed most tolerant of, this pretextual use
of the power to hold material witnesses. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
no prosecutor would have considered using material witness detentions
to hold suspects prior to September 11 because such use was universally
regarded as unreasonable. The reality is that historically the use of material
witness detentions to hold anyone other than a suspect as a material witness
was widely regarded as unreasonable and, for a twenty-year period, was
contrary to a New York statute.
161 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wesley MacNeil Oliver, supra note 151, at 19-20.
162 See id. at 20.
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Because of the history prompting the Fourth Amendment itself, the
Ninth Circuit further concluded Ashcroft was on notice that he violated the
Fourth Amendment by detaining someone he suspected of terrorist activity
as a witness. 163 In its opinion, the court offered a brief recitation of the
events commonly believed to have motivated the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment to draft this provision of the Bill of Rights. 16' It recounted
British outrage at the issuance of warrants that permitted officers to search
anywhere they chose to discover the authorship of papers libeling one of the
king's ministers.' 6 This history, the Ninth Circuit concluded, should have
put Ashcroft on notice that circumventing the probable cause requirement
to arrest a criminal suspect violated the Fourth Amendment. 166 It is difficult
to see what this particular history adds to the probable cause requirement
in the amendment itself. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Supreme Court
dispensed with the Ninth Circuit's attempt at this historical analogy with
his characteristically sarcastic pith: "Ashcroft must be forgiven for missing
the parallel, which escapes us as well."'167
IV. CORRECTING A CLEAR ERROR
The United States Supreme Court in Ashcroftv. al-Kiddwas in a position
in which it rarely finds itself, sitting as a Court for the correction of errors.
There was no circuit split on the limits of the government's subjective
intent in its use of material witness detentions.
Doctrinally, al-Kidd did not present an easy case; practically, it could
not have gone any other way. Prior to al-Kidd, the government's motive
for suspicionless intrusions for purposes other than the enforcement of
criminal law was relevant to assessing the legitimacy of the intrusion. Once
the government had adequate suspicion to justify a search or seizure to
investigate criminal wrongdoing, or to seize the defendant to commence
a prosecution, the "real" reason for the government's action became
irrelevant. AI-Kidd's facts placed it between the strains of existing authority.
Precedent did not resolve whether the government's motive mattered
when it sought to arrest an individual based on information unrelated to
his criminal wrongdoing but nevertheless specific to the arrestee. Prior to
al-Kidd, it was far from clear whether an individualized basis for suspecting
criminal wrongdoing, or merely individual consideration of any factors
justifying a search or seizure made the government actor's "real" motives
irrelevant.
163 AI-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 E3d 949,971 (9th Cir. 2009).
164 Id. at 972.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 972-73.
167 Ashcroft v. aI-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2o84 (201).
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The practical consequences of doing anything but reversing were
illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's bottom line. Innocent bystanders could be
detained more readily than terrorist suspects whom the government barely
lacked suspicion to charge. The purpose of a Material Witness Statute is
surely not to create a scheme of preventive detention,'16 but there would
be something quite odd about interpreting the statute to prevent a mixed
motive detention. The absence of suspicion obviously should not be a basis
for more readily detaining a witness. Further, witnesses with information
helpful to the prosecution in a criminal matter are often in positions that
would make the government suspect them of criminal involvement. If
the government could detain only those whom it suspected of nothing, or
demonstrate that it had no interest in prosecuting those whose testimony it
sought, this would substantially limit the usefulness of the statute.
Unsurprisingly, the majority's opinion was written by Justice Scalia. He
authored the Court's unanimous decision in Whren v. United States upon
which Ashcroft principally relied. Weaknesses in Scalia's opinion reveal
how poorly this case mapped onto any existing line of Fourth Amendment
precedent.
Justice Scalia reasoned that there were "two limited exceptions" to the
general rule that the motivations of government actors are irrelevant for
Fourth mendment purposes.16 9 These exceptions are "special needs" and
administrative searches and seizures. 70 By Scalia's own reasoning, however,
these exceptions are not so neatly defined as to exclude the government's
interest in ensuring a witness's presence at trial."' Further, Justice Scalia
recognized that these were not the only types of exceptions but made no
effort to exhaustively account for the other exceptions."
Special needs searches, according to his opinion, are justified by a
government interest "beyond the normal need for law enforcement."' 73
168 As David Cole has noted, however, the United States has a scheme of preventive
detention, though the purpose of such a scheme is not expressly recognized. Material wit-
ness detentions are part of this scheme. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention,
Suspected Terrorists, and.War, 97 CA9uF L. REv. 693, 722-25 (2009).
169 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o8o-8i.
170 Id.
171 The poorly defined quality of the category of "special needs" exceptions has been
frequently observed. E.g., Eva Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, i i i
COLUM. L. REV. 254, 257 (2011) ("[Slcholars and courts find it difficult to even define what an
administrative search is, let alone to explain what test governs the validity of such a search.");
Jonathan Kravis, A Better Interpretation of "Special Needs" Doctrine After Edmond and Ferguson,
I 12 YALE L.J. 2591, 2594-95 (2003).
172 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o8i ("The Government seeks to justify the present arrest on
the basis of a properly issued judicial warrant-so that the special-needs and administra-
tive-inspection cases cannot be the basis for a purpose inquiry here. Apart from those cases,
we have almost uniformly rejected invitations to probe subjective intent." (emphasis added)).
173 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o8i; see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,873 ( 987) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
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His separate category of administrative searches occur when a "search or
seizure is in execution of an administrative warrant," as when a warrant
permits inspectors to ensure compliance with housing codes. 114 It is not
entirely apparent that these are necessarily separate categories. The
exception for searches or seizures in either of these categories seems to
rest on the proposition that government intrusions for purposes other than
the enforcement of criminal laws may proceed with less stringent pre-
requisites, both substantively (i.e., something less than probable cause) and
procedurally (i.e., without a judicial warrant).175 It is possible to delineate
these two separate categories of special needs searches and administrative
searches, but the distinction has little substantive difference. Both permit
the government to justify a search or seizure without demonstrating
probable cause to a judicial officer.'76
Finally, the opinion recognized that there were other categories of
searches and seizures, other than "special needs" and administrative
intrusions, for which the motives for the intrusion were relevant.
Apart from those cases, we have almost uniformly rejected
invitations to probe subjective intent.... There is one category
of exception, upon which the Court of Appeals principally
relied. In Edmond, ... we held that the Fourth Amendment
could not condone suspicionless vehicle checkpoints set up for
the purpose of detecting illegal narcotics. 17
7
Just as it is not clear how there are different justifications for the
administrative warrant and "special needs" exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's baseline requirements, it is not clear how drug roadblocks
constitute a different "category of exception."' 171 It is not clear that drug
roadblocks are an exception to the Fourth Amendment's baseline
requirements at all. Most scholars regard drug roadblocks as simply not
fitting into an exception, as a drug roadblock is not performed to vindicate
an interest beyond the normal need for law enforcement. 17 9 As Scalia
described in the opinion, "we found the drug-detection purpose in Edmond
174 al-Kidd, I31 S. Ct. at zo8i.
175 See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 8I TEx. L. REv. 951, 1003-
10 (2003) (discussing the lower evidentiary standard required by courts for "special needs"
searches).
176 See Simmons, supra note 125, at 848 (referring to all such searches as "permissible
suspicionless searches").
177 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081.
178 Roadblocks have, for instance, been described by some scholars as administra-
tive searches and by others as "special needs" searches. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police
Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1522 (2009) (describing the "Court's 'special needs' precedents
involving roadblocks and inventory searches....") (footnotes omitted); Primus, supra note 170,
at 292-93 (describing roadblocks as administrative searches).
179 See Simmons, supra note 125, at 871-73.
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invalidating because it was 'ultimately indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control."'"" 0
If roadblocks, which do require an inquiry into the government's
motives, belong in a "category of exceptions," beyond administrative
and "special needs" searches, requiring an analysis of the government's
motives, are there other categories? And how would the court deal with
these other exceptional circumstances for which the motives of government
actors matter? Could there be another category of exception - perhaps
an administration of justice exception - which allows courts to subpoena
and detain witnesses? As Justice Scalia offered no single explanation for
the categories of cases requiring the government to have a pure motive,
his admittedly less than exhaustive accounting of the "categories of
exceptions" left a hole in his argument. To have acknowledged that under
existing doctrine, motives matter whenever the government acts without
suspicion of wrongdoing would have required Scalia to acknowledge he
was creating new law. Concluding that material wvitness detentions did not
fit into any recognized exception to the general prohibition on considering
a government actor's motive allowed Scalia's opinion to appear to be a
formalistic application of fact to rule rather than a choice of precedent
driven by policy considerations."'
The opinion would further (and falsely) lead a reasonable reader to
conclude that "special needs," administrative searches, and whatever
other "categor[ies] of exceptions" exist occur infrequently. The first two
were described as "limited exception[s]" to the baseline probable cause
and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.' "Special needs"
searches actually occur quite frequently as a corollary to the government's
investigatory efforts. Scalia's opinion noted that roadblocks to discover
intoxication are permitted by the government's interest in discovering
drunken drivers.I"3 Other types of special needs are used far more commonly.
Inventory searches, one of the many types of searches commonly permitted
for a purpose other than criminal investigation,"" are permitted whenever
a vehicle is impounded, to protect the seizing agency and storage facility
from lawsuits for theft.' Searches of inmates entering detention centers
18o al-Kidd, 13I S. Ct. at zo81.
Sx1 Justice Scalia, of course, generally prefers to uses formalistic rather than functionalis-
tic reasoning. See Daniel Farber, TheAges ofAmerican Formalism, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 91 (1995)
(describing Scalia as "the leading judicial formalist of our day").
i82 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o8o.
183 Id. at 2o81.
184 See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman" 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1752 (1994) ("Article after article documents
... how [the Court] has riddled the Warrant Clause with exceptions.").
185 See Dimino, supra note 178, at 1493.
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are permitted to ensure the safety of the facility.18 6 Passengers may be
ordered out of automobiles stopped for minor traffic offenses to ensure the
safety of the officer.1
87
Why, then, is the government's interest in obtaining a witness's testimony
at trial not a "special need"? Obviously, the testimony of witnesses is
part of the prosecution process, but a witness's appearance is compelled
without a demonstration of probable cause or judicial consideration in most
cases. Lawyers issue subpoenas to witnesses whose testimony they find
relevant. Certainly the ordinary process of securing a witness's appearance
is not protected by a judicial determination of probable cause. Though
a court has never so characterized the subpoena power, surely a "special
need" explains why lawyers are permitted to determine when a witness's
testimony is relevant and compel his presence. Material witness arrests
are justified by the need to obtain the same goal the subpoena ordinarily
achieves. By definition, such arrests are permitted only when use of the
subpoena would be "impracticable."' 88
Justice Scalia did not look to the goal of material witness arrests, which
seemingly must be viewed as unrelated to the ordinary enforcement
of criminal law, if subpoenas can continue to be issued without judicial
supervision. Scalia looked at the process used to authorize material witness
detentions to conclude that they did not fit within the "special needs"
paradigm.'89 As a "warrant issued by a neutral Magistrate Judge authorized
al-Kidd's arrest" and "the warrant application . . . gave individualized
reasons to believe that he was a material witness and that he would soon
disappear," Justice Scalia therefore concluded the arrest fit within the
larger paradigm of cases, exemplified by Whren v. United States, for which
government actors' subjective motives were irrelevant.19g "The existence of
a judicial warrant based on individualized suspicion takes this case outside
the domain of not only our special-needs and administrative-search cases,
but of Edmond as well." 191
As al-Kidd argued, however, Whren found only that an official's
subjective motives are irrelevant where there is "probable cause to believe
that a violation of law has occurred."' 9 The basis for al-Kidd's arrest was
not related to any criminal wrongdoing on his part. His case did not fit
into the Whren paradigm. Justice Scalia essentially relied on a principle
of basic logic to negate this argument. Whren stood for the proposition
that if a seizure is based on probable cause, then the officer's motives are
i86 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983).
187 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997).
i88 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2oo6).
189 Ashcroft v. aI-Kidd, 13I S. Ct. 2074, 2o82 (zoi i).
19o Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,8 81 (i996)').
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irrelevant.' 93 The inverse of this proposition is not necessarily true as a
matter of pure logic." "[T]o say that ulterior motives do not invalidate a
search that is legitimate because of probable cause to believe a crime has
occurred is-not to say that it does invalidate all searches that are legitimate
for other reasons."'9' In typical Scalia fashion, he then added a gratuitous
insult: "Only an undiscerning reader.. .would think otherwise." 9 6
Of course the fact that Whren's holding does not logically require the
conclusion al-Kidd sought does not mean that its reasoning does not
help define the circumstances when a government actor's motivations
are relevant. Certainly the true value of the inverse of the quotation from
Whren is unknown as a matter of logic.' 97 Whren's observation that officers'
motivation were not relevant where probable cause of wrongdoing exists
does raise the possibility, if not the presumption, however, that an officer's
motivations are relevant when probable cause of wrongdoing does not exist.
However, Scalia concluded suspicion of wrongdoing was not required.
Individualized consideration of the facts allegedly justifying al-Kidd's
arrest made the government actor's motivations irrelevant 98 Justice
Ginsberg's concurrence observed that "the word 'suspicion' . . . ordinarily
indicates that the person suspected has engaged in wrongdoing."'" Scalia
responded:
No usage of the word [suspicion] is more common and idiomatic
than a statement such as "I have suspicion he knows s6mething
about the crime," or even "I have a suspicion she is throwing
me a surprise birthday party." The many cases cited by Justice
GINSBERG, which use the neutral word "suspicion" in
connection with wrongdoing, prove nothing except that searches
and seizures for reasons other than suspected wrongdoing are
rare.
200
The cases are sufficiently rare that the Court had never, prior to al-Kidd,
considered the issue presented in this case. New law had to be carved to
account for this situation despite Scalia's protests that this issue was clearly
dictated by existing precedent.
193 See Craig M. Glantz, "Could" This Be the End of the Fourth Amendment Protections for
Motorists?, 87 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 864,864 (1997).
194 See Karl J. Smith, INTRODUCTION TO SYMBOLIC LOGIC 36-37 (2d ed. 1991).
195 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082.
196 Id. at 2082 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197 See Smith, supra note 194
198 Justice Ginsberg contested Justice Scalia's conclusion that the government's evi-
dence that al-Kidd had information, even if the evidence was compelling, amounted to indi-
vidual suspicion as that term had been understood prior to the al-Kidd case. ai-Kidd, 131 S
Ct. at 2o88 n.2 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
zoo Id. at 2088 n.2 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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The government had argued that if the motives for the detention were
relevant, then witnesses suspected of nothing but possessing information
could be held more readily than al-Qaeda members with information.2 0
The government, along with its arguments that the result in this case was
dictated by precedent, had offered a practical consideration for resolving
the case, but practical considerations were no part of the opinion. Justice
Scalia's approach took care of this concern and had the effect of constricting
the category of special needs searches, but did not offer an explanation for
his new approach to the special needs category.
Having found the possible investigatory motives of a government actor
seeking a material witness warrant constitutionally irrelevant, Justice Scalia
spent little time concluding that John Ashcroft was not on notice that the
Fourth Amendment precluded witness detentions for an investigative
purpose. It is not clear why he needed to address this issue at all given that
he first held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. If there was
no Fourth Amendment violation, there is no way Ashcroft could have been
on notice of such a violation. 02
The facts of the case, however, prevented these from being the last
words of the case. Three members of the Court, Ginsberg, Breyer and
Sotomayor, did not join the majority's conclusion that the pretextual use
of material witness detentions did not violate the Fourth Amendment
as each regarded resolution of this issue to be unnecessary to resolve the
case. 03 Justices Ginsberg observed the "serious questions, unaddressed by
the Court, concerning the legality of the Government's use of the Material
Witness Statute in this case."z°4 Justice Ginsberg was particularly concerned
about the affidavit the government filed in support of the arrest warrant,
the government's omission of its disinterest in using his testimony at trial,
and the "harsh custodial conditions to which al-Kidd was subjected,"
which she aptly described as "brutal." ' 5 She also recognized that there
was a threshold question about the factual basis supporting even the initial
decision to arrest al-Kidd.
2oi Brief of Petitioner at 3 9 ,Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. Io-98), 2010
WL 5087872 ("[Tlhe fear of personal liability may dissuade prosecutors from obtaining such a
warrant when they harbor any suspicion that the subject might be involved in criminal wrong-
doing but do not yet have probable cause to bring criminal charges.").
202 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009) (overruling Saucierv. Katz, 533 U.S.
194 (zooi), which previously required courts to decide whether a constitutional right had been
violated before addressing whether the right was clearly established); Karen M. Blum, Section
1983 Litigation: Post-Pearson andPost-Iqbal, z6 TouRo L. REV. 433,436-38 (20 10).
203 See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o87 (Ginsberg, J., concurring); id. at 2o89 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
204 Id. at 2089 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
205 Id.
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Judicial officers asked to issue material witness warrants must
determine whether the affidavit supporting the application
shows that "the testimony of a person is material in a criminal
proceeding" and that "it may become impracticable to secure
the presence of the person by subpoena." 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
Even if these conditions are met, issuance of the warrant is
discretionary. Ibid. ("judicial officer may order the arrest of the
person" (emphasis added)). A1-Kidd's experience illustrates
the importance of vigilant exercise of this checking role by the
judicial officer to whom the warrant application is presented.
The affidavit used to secure al-Kidd's detention was
spare; it did not state with particularity the information al-
Kidd purportedly possessed, nor did it specify how al-Kidd's
knowledge would be material to Sami Omar al-Hussayen's
prosecution. As to impracticability, the affidavit contained only
this unelaborated statement: "It is believed that if AI-Kidd
travels to Saudi Arabia, the United States Government will be
unable to secure his presence at trial via subpoena." App. 64.
Had the Magistrate Judge insisted on more concrete showings
of materiality and impracticability, al-Kidd might have been
spared the entire ordeal.
2 06
While Justice Ginsberg raised a concern about the application of
the materiality requirement of the Material Witness Statute, Justice
Kennedy raised a brief, but poignant, question about the application of the
impracticability requirement: -
Under the statute, a MagistrateJudge may issue a warrant to arrest
someone as a material witness upon a showing by affidavit that
"the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding"
and "that it may become impracticable to secure the presence
of the person by subpoena." 18 U.S.C. § 3144. The scope of
the statute's lawful authorization is uncertain. For example, a
law-abiding citizen might observe a crime during the days or
weeks before a scheduled flight abroad. It is unclear whether
those facts alone might allow police to obtain a material witness
warrant on the ground that it "may become impracticable" to
secure the person's presence by subpoena. Ibid. The question
becomes more difficult if one further assumes the traveler
would be willing to testify if asked; and more difficult still if
one supposes that authorities delay obtaining or executing
the warrant until the traveler has arrived at the airport. These
possibilities resemble the facts in this case. 07
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence succinctly stated a sentiment that
pervaded both Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsberg's opinion: "[N]
othing in the majority's opinion today should be read as placing this Court's
imprimatur on the actions taken by the Government against al-Kidd." '
Interestingly, the Justice Department did not specifically seek review
of the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that John Ashcroft's policies were
206 Id. at zo88 n.2.
207 Id. at 2085-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2o8 Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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sufficiently connected to the decision to seek an invalid material witness
warrant to permit liability under Iqbal. Review was sought only of the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that "the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from
executing a valid material witness warrant with the subjective intent of
conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject." 209
Depending on what happens on remand, the former attorney general
may still be liable for inadequately supervising material witness arrests to
ensure that they are not sought when there is no basis for detention under
the Material Witness Statute.
V. CONCERNS THAT WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT
It would have been illogical to permit the detention of a witness
suspected of no wrongdoing, while forbidding the detention of one who
possesses helpful information and is also suspected of wrongdoing. The
reality, though, that the Material Witness Statute can be used as a method
of investigating the witness's criminal act raises a set of concerns that need
to be addressed by courts and legislatures. The abuses al-Kidd, and others
like him, suffered should never again be tolerated.
Prosecutors and police can be largely trusted to self-regulate the
treatment of a detained witness if these persons truly are merely persons
whose testimony will be useful to the government °10 The government
would have plenty of incentive to ensure at least decent treatment for
those it wishes to use as witness and would be reluctant to detain those
whose assistance alone was sought. " ' The government would want these
witnesses to testify to the best of their ability and forcible detention and
poor conditions of confinement would surely undermine that goal."'2 The
witness-suspect can rely on no similar hope of self-restraint, as the plight
of al-Kidd himself vividly demonstrates.
209 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (20 11) (No. o-98),
2010 WL 2830439 at *I.
2io In a case involving a cooperating witness suspected of criminal wrongdoing, the gov-
ernment's favorable treatment will often involve promises of leniency in punishment. See
George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. i, 18 (2000) ("[lit is well-established that prosecutors in federal criminal cases can offer
lenient treatment and cash rewards to accomplices, informers, or other cooperating witnesses
who testify for the government. The trend in modern federal case law is to accept even overtly
contingent agreements for testimony." (footnotes omitted)).
zn See Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of Informants andAccomplice Witnesses, 50 S.C. L. REV.
679,679 (1999) ("Rarely are informants public-spirited citizens who volunteer solely because
they have information that might be useful. Informants usually receive some compensation or
benefit for their information in the form of a reward, regular monetary payments, reimburse-
ment for expenses, or other benefit.").
212 See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHio ST. L.J. 69, 1o1 0995) (observing
that government will often reserve the terms of a plea deal to ensure that the defendant testi-
fies to the best of his ability).
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The efforts to use the detentions to obtain evidence against the
witness-suspect, though they raise thorny issues, can and likely will be
resolved by courts. Limits on the government's ability to use the Material
Witness Statute to preventively detain the witness-suspect, however, can
only realistically be addressed by Congress.
The Material Witness Statute offers prosecutors a potential means
of bypassing protections available to suspects in ordinary criminal
investigations. Courts are, however, in a good position to evaluate the
legitimacy of using these detentions to obtain evidence against suspects.
Courts must necessarily pass on the admissibility of evidence in criminal
cases, providing ample opportunity for the development of common law
rules.
The use that courts may make of evidence obtained against witnesses
will nevertheless present difficult questions. Consider the two most
regulated aspects of police investigation - the seizure of physical evidence
and extraction of statements from persons in custody.
It is not entirely clear whether physical evidence obtained incident
to a material witness arrest may be used against the witness, regardless
of the motivation for the arrest. 13 Evidence obtained incident to material
witness's arrest can be viewed either as the product of an ordinary arrest,
in which case the only limitation would be the location of the evidence
obtained. The government's interest in protecting officer safety and
preventing suspects from destroying evidence in his possession justifies
the search incident to arrest. 14 If material witness arrests are treated like
ordinary arrests, anything within the witness's grabbing area at the time of
his arrest could be admitted against him in any criminal proceeding."5
Alternatively, these arrests could be viewed like the impoundment of
an automobile."1 6 While a material witness is certainly an animate human
being who may pose risks to the officer like other arrestees, he is unlike
an ordinary arrestee in that the government has not.shown that there is
an evidentiary basis for believing him guilty of a crime."1 7 There is thus
213 One court has ruled that the fruits of a pretextual material witness arrest are inadmis-
sible. State v. Hand, 242 A.2d 888, 897 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
214 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 986 (2011) (describing historical pedigree of search-incident-
to-arrest doctrine).
2iS The grabbing area doctrine has lately gone through a number of transformations
when the person arrested was driving an automobile. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
For competing views on the effect of Gant, compare Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does
It Matter?, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 275 (2009) with Christopher D. Totten, Arizona v. Gant and Its
Aftermath: A Doctrinal "Correction" Without the Anticipated "Gains", 46 CRM. L. BULL. 6 (zo 1o).
216 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,372 (1987);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,375-76 (1976).
217 Terry v. Ohio is another example of the potential of a defendant's danger being insuffi-
cient for a government intrusion. A pat-down is justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion
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no legal basis for suspecting that he will have evidence to destroy. Under
current law, this would not itself raise a question about the government's
right to take the same precautions it takes when detaining others."1 8 The
same fear of pretext that animates an inventory search of an impounded car,
however, animates the search-incident-to-arrest of a material witness." 9
The arrest could well be an effort to conduct a search unsupported by
any legal foundation and, while problematic in itself, could dramatically
increase the use of witness detentions.
The logical extension of Justice Scalia's majority opinion in al-Kidd
would suggest that material witness arrests are no different than ordinary
arrests as each are supported by individualized suspicion, a characterization
challenged by three concurring justices." Viewing material witness arrests
as functionally identical to ordinary arrests, however, would confer on
prosecutors and police the power to draw inferences about group criminality
that the Supreme Court has long rejected. Consider the facts of Ybarra v.
Illinois.22' Police officers had probable cause to believe that the bartender
of the Aurora Tap Room was selling heroin and obtained a warrant to search
the bar and the bartender.2 2 In executing the warrant, officers also patted
down patrons of the bar discovering heroin in a cigarette pack on Ventura
that the suspect is armed and dangerous and has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.
Suspicion of danger alone is insufficient for a pat-down. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27
(1968); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2oo9) (noting the two separate require-
ments, suspicion of wrongdoing and reason to believe the suspect is armed and dangerous, to
permit pat-down).
218 To the contrary, however, the Court has held that once an arrest is legitimate, the gov-
ernment's interest in officer safety permits a search incident to arrest, even if there is almost
no reason to think the arrestee will possess evidence of a crime. See United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. z8, 235 (1973).
219 No doubt the difficulty of administrability is a big part of the Supreme Court's re-
luctance to include a concern about pretext in its criminal procedure cases. Technically, in-
ventory searches of impounded automobiles are forbidden if the search is motivated by the
officer's interest in searching for evidence. If conducted for a reason other than protecting the
impounding authority from civil suits for theft or damage, such searches are forbidden by the
Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. Demonstrating that the
search was conducted for the illegitimate basis of searches for evidence is, as a practical mat-
ter, nearly impossible. The Supreme Court has held that the search is legitimate if consistent
with the plan developed to search all such impounded cars. Lower courts have held that such
plans need not be written. In one particularly noteworthy case, the Sixth Circuit held that the
inspection of a vehicle's engine block was consistent with a non-pretextual inventory search.
Inventory searches must.merely be consistent with a policy, which is not required to be writ-
ten. Chad Carr, To Impound or Not to Impound: Why Courts Need to Define Legitimate Impoundment
Purposes to Restore Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights to Motorists, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 95, 112-13
(201o).
220 SeeAshcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2o88 (2011) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
221 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
222 Id. at 88.
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Ybarra.3 If pretext is irrelevant in how we view evidence obtained in a
material witness arrest, imagine the slightly different application that would
have been presented to the magistrate in the Ybarra case. Officers would
have sought warrants to arrest the patrons to the bar as material witnesses
to the drug dealing inside.114 The fear of this sort of creative use of material
witness detentions is particularly acute if warrants are not constitutionally
required for material witness arrests, another issue yet to be resolved."2 5
Once arrested, is the material witness in custody for the purpose of
Miranda v. Arizona? The answer initially appears to be an unequivocal "yes"
as the detainee is most emphatically in custody. If the suspect is arrested
on suspicion of a robbery, he may not be questioned about an unrelated
murder unless he waives his Miranda rights to silence and presence of
counsel at questioning.2 6 He can waive his rights when he thinks he is
just being investigated for the robbery and that waiver is valid even if the
subject matter changes to a different, and even substantially more serious,
crime, but there must be a waiver."2 7 Likewise it might seem readily obvious
that the interrogation of an arrested material witness may not be admitted
unless the detainee waives his Miranda rights. Law enforcement officers
who arrest the witness on one basis seemingly would not be permitted to
question him about other matters without a Miranda waiver at some point.
The answer is not, however, that easily resolved. If the police question
a person serving a prison sentence, or judicially committed to a mental
hospital, Miranda warnings are not required so long as officers impose
no additional constraints on freedom. 218 Courts may well conclude that if
officers are detaining the witness for a purpose other than prosecuting him,
his confinement, like that of the state prisoner or mental health patient, is
not for the purpose of criminal investigation, making the Miranda warnings
223 Id. at 89.
224 Loose interpretations of materiality and impracticability could make this concern less
than far-fetched. Limits on materiality could also prevent this sort of problem. See discussion
at infra note 226-3 1 and accompanying text.
225 Certainly the federal Material Witness Statute and the Material Witness Statutes in
most states provide for a warrant for a material witness arrest. They do not, however, provide
that material witness arrests require a warrant. Even if they did expressly limit material wit-
ness arrests to those authorized by warrant, these statutes would be largely irrelevant if a court
were to conclude that warrants were not constitutionally required to arrest material witnesses.
See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177-78 (zoo8) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not forbid an arrest for even petty offenses, and officers' violations of state statutes requir-
ing citations in lieu of arrests would not require evidence obtained incident to arrest to be
excluded).
226 See Adam J. Hegler, Is the Temple Collapsing?: Montejo v. Louisiana and the Extent of the
Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings, 6i S.C. L. REv. 867, 873-74 (2010).
227 Id.
228 See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, io J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 382-89 (2011 ); Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate:
Defining Miranda Custody for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 883, 941-43 (1997).
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unnecessary.2 9 The Justice Department apparently concluded that this
was the likely approach courts would take as they did not give al-Kidd his
Miranda warnings before questioning him after his arrest. 3' Obviously, if
this is a valid interpretation of the Miranda protections, or lack thereof, for
material witness detainees, prosecutors and police have a real incentive to
rely heavily on their power to detain material witnesses. Such detentions
would provide a bypass to the current scheme of regulating interrogations.2 3'
As problematic as these concerns are, they are well within the ability
of courts to address. Courts, in fact, must address these issues whenever
the prosecution attempts to use evidence obtained from a material
witness arrest to convict the witness himself. Once the witness becomes
a defendant, he will be represented by counsel who will challenge the
legality of the government source of all the evidence it is using against
him. 3 ' If the government or states start to use material witness detentions
229 One could look to the Miranda rights of a pretrial detainee as a basis for resolving this
issue. Once a magistrate has decided that a criminal defendant must be held pending trial to
ensure his presence and the safety of the community, the considerations justifying his deten-
tion are not formally about the investigation of a crime. The basis of pretrial detention is iden-
tical to the basis for a material witness arrest and detention. The Sixth Amendment precludes
the prosecution from questioning the defendant about crime for which he is detained. While
the amendment is offense-specific, the defendant is a represented party once he is commit-
ted to jail pending trial, thus forbidding the government from communicating with him under
most rules of ethics. Rarely, then, has there been an occasion for a prosecutor to attempt to
question a suspect being held pending trial about an unrelated matter without implicating
other rules of criminal procedure.
23o First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *29-3o.
23t The protections provided by Miranda have been substantially weakened in the
recent terms of the United States Supreme Court. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth
Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GE6. L.J. 1, 16-25 (2oo). The
Court has not, however, said that police departments can decide that they will interrogate
without using the warnings and still admit the confessions. This view of the protections af-
forded detained material witnesses in interrogations would provide the police just that power.
A material witness warrant could come to be the preferred warrant if the rules of interrogation
are more favorable to the police.
232 There is, in fact, an almost knee-jerk response defense lawyers have to seek to ex-
clude evidence that could in any way harm their clients' cases. One by-product of the le-
gal academy's case law approach to learning has been to make defense lawyers very.good at
looking at police reports to determine whether there is a basis to challenge the admissibility
of incriminating evidence. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule,
2o HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 443, 453 (1997) (observing that over-worked public defenders
will frequently allocate resources toward excluding illegally obtained evidence). Lawyers are
much better at excluding than discovering evidence. The academy has done a poor job teach-
ing lawyers how to investigate. Prosecutors, of course, rely on the professional investigators,
the police. Defense lawyers often do not have the luxury of having an investigator as part
of a defense team. Two pieces of evidence reveal the inadequacy of legal training to equip
lawyers to deal with this important aspect of their jobs. Five instances of wrongful conviction
were discovered on Illinois' death row by Northwestern graduate students, but not students
in the law school. Journalism students, who are trained to find facts, discovered these egre-
gious errors. See Brian Rosenthal, In Focus: Investigative Journalism Students Used Questionably
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as a means of collecting physical evidence or extracting confessions, courts
will be presented with the legitimacy of these methods. Courts will also
have an interest in ensuring that the protections they have fashioned not
be obliterated by a prosecution theory - a little too clever by seven-eighths
- that a search of a person, or a custodial interrogation, is exempt because
the target is called a "witness."
Courts are in a poor position, by contrast, to develop protections against
the non-investigatory aspects of material witness detentions, regardless of
whether the witness is suspected of wrongdoing and detained preventively
or genuinely held to guarantee his testimony. What is a sufficient factual
basis for detaining a witness? What constitutes sufficient evidence that a
subpoena will not practically secure the witness' appearance? How long
may witnesses be detained? Is a witness entitled to a hearing before he is
arrested? What are the terms of confinement for witnesses? For a variety of
reasons, these questions are not easily answered by courts.
The materiality and impracticability requirements of the Material
Witness Statute are too vague to provide notice about who may be
detained. It is not clear how essential a witness's testimony must be for it to
meet the materiality standard in the statute. Typically, claims that statutes
are void for vagueness are made about provisions of the criminal code. 33
Vague statutes raise concerns about an individual's ability to know what
the statute proscribes.'-' Without adequate clarity, it is impossible to avoid
committing proscribed conduct. Material witness detentions obviously do
not depend on a witness's wrongdoing. There is nothing inherently wrong
about possessing information material to a prosecution. It is not clear
that citizens would know how to avoid knowing information helpful to a
criminal prosecution and, even they could, it is even less clear that society
would be better if they did so. 35
Ethical Reporting Tactics, Sources Say, DAILY Nw., May 4, 2o I, http://www.dailynorthwestern.
com/campus/in-focus-investigative-journalism-students-used-questionably-ethical-re-
porting-tactics-sources-say-.255886#.TrcHgXPgAqk. Secondly, the number of death sen-
tences in this country has been dramatically dropping because the defense of capital cases has
come to involve telling-the defendant's own human story, rather than attempting to somehow
minimize the crime he committed. This innovation was not developed by lawyers but by
mitigation specialists, generally trained in social work. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator, NEw
YORKER, May 9, 2o I1, http:l/www.newyorker.com/reporting/2o 11/05/09/11 5o9fa-fact-toobin.
Lawyers are not particularly good at a number of things their jobs require, but they are very
good at discovering how the exclusionary rule can be used to their client's advantage, thus
assisting courts in placing limits on government investigations.
233 See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court's Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 73 (2010) (observing that "[i]n a variety of civil rights cases, the Court
has developed the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth to place limitations on
substantive criminal law statutes.").
234 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 6o VAND. L. REv. 1497, 1510-I I
(2007) (describing constitutional prohibition on vague criminal laws).
235 The fear of being detained as a material witness led many to deny knowledge of
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The impracticability of the subpoena requirement also suffers from
lack of clarity. What actions sufficiently demonstrate that it would be
"impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena"? 36 Is
international travel sufficient? Does the witness have to manifest his refusal
to assist the government? What is sufficient evidence of such a refusal? The
statute provides no indication to witnesses about the steps they must take,
or not take, to demonstrate they will comply with a subpoena.
The other concern typically raised with vague criminal statutes is
arbitrary enforcement. 37 With the Supreme Court's decision in al-Kidd,
arbitrary enforcement becomes a very real concern. The requirements of
materiality and impracticability should prevent prosecutors from having
unchecked power to order the arrest - and seek the detention - of any
persons they choose. But with little guidance on how to decide cases,
judicial considerations of applications for material witness warrants could
therefore easily turn on the extent to which the government describes
a basis to fear the witness, rather than reasons he will be unavailable to
provide valuable testimony.
Just how important must the witness's testimony be to the government's
case to permit an arrest? The statute certainly does not require that the
testimony be offered at trial. The prosecutor's contemplation that the
testimony would be useful to a grand jury's investigation would appear to
be facially sufficient.
Materiality has been defined in other contexts, but none sufficiently
analogous to material witness detentions to define the limits on these
arrests. 3 To issue a subpoena in another state, a party to litigation must
demonstrate that the witness's testimony would be material. 39 In this
context, some courts have refused to issue subpoenas if the requested
testimony is not adequately described in the request, 40 is speculative,
4
,
events surrounding crimes in late nineteenth century New York. This concern was so pressing
that the New York Police Department asked the legislature to abolish the power to detain
witnesses to alleviate the public's concern. See Oliver, supra note 82, at 776.
236 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
237 See Oliver, supra note 82, at 776.
238 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime's Gray Area: The Anomaly of
Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2009) (observing low stan-
dard of materiality in wire and mail fraud statutes); Bennett L. Gershman, The "Pejury Trap",
129 U. PA. L. REV. 624,688 (1981) ("In view of the attenuated concepts of materiality that have
been articulated in the context of the various federal and state perjury statutes, this require-
ment is of little practical value." (footnote omitted)); Ellen S. Podgor, Making 'Materiality' an
Element of Obstruction of Justice, ThE CHAMPION, Sept:-Oct. 2005, at 26.
239 See UNIF. ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS § 3 (1936).
240 See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 1OO (Mass. 1971); People
v. McCartney, 345 N.E.2d 326, 329 (N.Y. 1976); Weaver v. State, 657 S.W.2d 148, 150-51 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983).
241 See Commonwealth v. Smith, 561 N.E.2d 520, 524-25 (Mass. App. Ct. 199o); Bell v.
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or is even duplicative of other testimony.42 The Utah Supreme Court even
held that the materiality requirement for an out-of-state subpoena was
satisfied only if there was a plausible showing that there was a reasonable
probability that the testimony would affect the outcome of a trial. 43 These
limits on materiality in the issuance of interstate subpoenas for witnesses
do not even presently apply to the government's efforts to arrest a witness.
Seemingly, these limitations should apply to the government's efforts to
make an arrest under the Material Witness Statutes.
Materiality is also defined in perjury and fraud statutes.2" Borrowing
from cases interpreting the term in this context raises a similar set of
problems. A broad view of materiality in these contexts encourages truth-
telling. A broad reading of materiality in the context of material witness
detentions opens wide the scope of persons whom the government may
arrest for possessing information.
With few material witness arrests, and almost no practical opportunity
for appellate review of the circumstances leading to the arrests, magistrate
judges have only the limited guidance interpreting materiality that comes
from these other statutes. The facts in the al-Kidd case reveal how little
guidance courts are given. A federal magistrate judge found the government
had sufficiently demonstrated that materiality had been satisfied, even
though Justice Breyer in the oral argument strongly suggested it had not
been and Justice Ginsberg concluded that it had not been in her opinion.145
The limited number of opportunities for courts to develop criteria
construing materiality in this context leaves Congress in a better position
to flesh out the meaning of this vague term.
Similar issues are raised by the criteria requiring the government to show
"it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person."146 In his
opinion, Justice Kennedy raised a concern about the very broad basis the
statute gives the government to arrest a witness. Kennedy queried whether
a planned trip out of town was sufficient to justify an arrest, especially if
the witness agreed to appear when required by subpoena. 47 Predictions
State, 885 P.2d 1311 (Nev. 1994).
242 See State v. Smith, 753 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); People v. McKinney, 157
Cal. Rptr. 414,431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Burt, 658 N.E.2d 375,387 (I11. 995); State v.
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1982).
243 State v. Shreuder, 712 P.zd 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985).
244 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 238, at 688-9o (describing materiality as a common
requirement of perjury statutes); James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie Webster Popham, Materiality
and the False Claims Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 839, 840-41 (2003); Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial
Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 143, 150-52
(zoo) (describing materiality in stock fraud context).
245 SeeTranscript of Oral Argument, Ashcroft V. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (zoi) (No. o-
98), 2011 WL 719621 at *13-14; al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o88 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
246 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (zoo6) (emphasis added).
247 al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2o85-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of future conduct are inherently unreliable."' Seizures or detentions of
persons have, in other contexts, been permitted only on predictions of
future dangerousness. 49 The Material Witness Statute involves a prediction
that a witness will not comply with a subpoena.
One solution to Fourth Amendment concerns about an arrest based
on future unavailability is to provide the witness a hearing before he is
arrested, which would give him an opportunity to demonstrate that he
will appear before he is arrested. Some states have developed such a
rule by legislative act, or judicial interpretation of constitutional limits on
seizures. 50 With such a limitation, material witness warrants essentially
become super-subpoenas, issued for the witness's appearance in advance
of trial to provide the court an opportunity to assess what restraints are
necessary. If the witness fails to appear for this hearing, the court obviously
has the power to order his arrest for contempt. As the federal statute
reads, there is no requirement that the government show that the witness
would not comply with a requirement that he appear at such a hearing,
or that too much risk would be involved in waiting to see if the witness
failed to comply. Congress has demonstrated considerable competency in
identifying criteria courts ought to consider in determining what conditions
will ensure a defendant's (or indeed, a witness's) appearance at trial in the
Bail Reform Act. Congress could and should identify the criteria that permit
essentially an emergency detention before the witness has a chance to be
heard on the conditions that will ensure his presence. As Justice Kennedy
described, the impracticability requirement provides almost no guidance to
judges hearing material witness detention hearings.
Statutory or constitutional terms that lack precision are not as problematic
in other contexts. Frequently vague terms are clarified through judicial
application. The imprecision of materiality and impracticability present
concerns in this context that similarly imprecise terms would not present
248 See Adam Lamparello, Using Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future Dangerousness, 42
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 481,488-89 (zoi ) (recognizing difficulty of predicting future dan-
gerousness but proposing ways in which neuroscience can aid in that assessment).
249 Pretrial detention, incarceration of sex offenders after they serve their sentences,
death sentences in some jurisdictions, and involuntarily commitments can all be based on pre-
dictions of future dangerousness. See Elyce H. Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness:
The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562,562 n.z (1985).
250 A number of states have such provisions. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 522 (2010). Other states
are more ambiguous. Alabama and Tennessee each provide, for instance, that a magistrate may
require a material witness, who has either refused to comply with a subpoena in the past, or
will do so in the future, to secure his appearance with bond. ALA. CODE § 15-11-12(a) (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-I 1-110 (2006). These statutes do not appear to be used often as each
note that the magistrate may, in his discretion, require bond of married women and minors.
ALA. CODE § 15-11-13 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-10-1tO. Alabama provides that the wit-
ness may be required to enter into a bond for $ioo. ALA. CODE § 15-1-Iz(a). Ifa witness is
unlikely to appear, it seems doubtful that a secured or unsecured bond - or even cash bond of
$ioo will impose a condition sufficient to ensure compliance.
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in other contexts. The law certainly is comfortable with vague terms.
Probable cause, for instance, is one of the best known of them. Officers,
however, have a reasonable sense of what it means to have probable cause
because courts are constantly interpreting this term. Criminal defendants
who have been the subject of searches - and with our drug laws there are
plenty of those - are highly incentivized to object to the legitimacy of
searches. They are given lawyers who, at least in many drug cases, know
that a successful suppression motion ends the prosecution's case. These
defendants, who are provided the right to counsel through the appellate
stage, are constantly forcing the creation of reported decisions fleshing out
the contours of search and seizure law. There is no dearth of judicial gloss
on the Framer's vague term "probable cause."
The rarity of material witness detentions raises an odd civil rights concern
for those witnesses the government may consider detaining in the future.
There cannot be an adequate body of law clarifying the vague materiality
and impracticality terms in the Material Witness Statute. Not only are
material witness arrests infrequently sought, appellate review of arrest and
detention decisions are even rarer.2 11 The witness is provided counsel at
the detention hearing, which provides an opportunity and incentive for the
witness to argue that neither of the requirements for his arrest were met. If
these requirements have not been demonstrated, then he should simply be
released without any conditions. The Bail Reform Act, however, provides
no right to counsel if he chooses to appeal restrictions placed on him at
the hearing."' 2 Unlike a criminal defendant, who is appointed counsel for
any matters arising during the course of his prosecution, a witness's brief
representation ends with the detention hearing. A criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to counsel on appeal. 53 An arrested witness has no
constitutional right to counsel on appeal or otherwise."' Magistrate judges
rarely have occasions to interpret materiality and impracticability in the
context of material witness detentions; district and appellate judges almost
never have such opportunities. Congress is thus not only in the best position
to offer better definitions of these vague terms, in many ways, but it is also
251 The Iowa Supreme Court recently held, in an unusual appellate decision interpreting
the limits of material witness detentions, that under Iowa's poorly drafted material witness
statute, a witness may only be detained until an indictment is handed down, which permits
the issuance of subpoenas. In re Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 145, 162 (Iowa zo i).
252 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2oo6).
253 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (holding that indigent defen-
dants have a right to counsel on appeal); see also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 497-98
(1963) (holding that indigent defendants must be provided with free transcript).
254 Courts have yet to address this issue, but the trend in the United States Supreme
Court would suggest that the Court is not receptive to such a claim. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
Ct. 2507, 2515-16 (201 I) (holding that a defendant has no right to counsel where incarceration
is possible in civil contempt proceeding).
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in the only position to tighten the criteria determining when an individual
may be arrested on the basis that he possesses information.
Once a witness is then arrested, there are substantial issues regarding
the terms of his confinement that are also poorly suited for judicial
restriction. A large portion of al-Kidd's complaint related to the terms
of his confinement prior to the detention hearing.255 Courts have shown
little interest in defining the terms of confinement for a person in federal
custody. A federal court, which certainly has access to criminal records and
the very extensive reports prepared by Pre-Trial Services, may make only
recommendations to the Federal Bureau of Prisons about the location or
even level of confinement. 56 Courts would seem to have a vested interest in
ensuring that they have control over both the length and terms of sentences
they render. While many federal judges criticized the highly restrictive
quality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and some even resigned
over them, there has been no similar judicial outrage over the limited role
federal judges have to decide how prisoners should be confined." 7 Just as
a pre-trial detainee may present unique security risks, the same could be
true for a material witness. Congress, however, has demonstrated a unique
ability in this area with the Bail Reform Act. 5 ' Just as it described the
conditions bearing on whether a pre-trial detainee should be admitted to
bail, it should describe the terms of confinement appropriate for material
witnesses. Presumably that would involve the most minimal degree of
custody imaginable absent circumstances that would be identified.
Once a federal judge determines that a witness may be detained, a poor
bit of legislative drafting has left uncertain exactly how he can obtain his
freedom prior to the trial for which his testimony is needed. Under the
statute, "[no material witness may be detained because of inability to
comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can
adequately be secured by deposition." '59 How is the magistrate to decide
whether a deposition is sufficient? In over half of the material witness
detentions after September 11, federal judges refused requests to allow
material witnesses to submit to depositions. 60 Just as with the materiality
requirement itself, there is no criteria for establishing the government's
255 See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 14, at *20-22.
256 Yana Dobkin, Cabining the Discretion of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Federal
Courts: Interpretive Rules, Statutory Interpretation, and the Debate Over Community Confinement
Centers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 171, 18o-8i (2005).
257 See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement of Federal
Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 243 (2004); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223,
244 (1993); Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 199o, at A22.
258 See Robert S. Natalini, Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1985).
259 i8 U.S.C. § 3144 (2oo6).
260 See Carlson, supra note 148, at 966-71.
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need for live as opposed to transcribed testimony, and the nature of these
cases do not provide a ready mechanism for the development of common
law on this issue.
How long may those witnesses detained after arrest, and denied an
opportunity to be deposed and released, be held? Must they be released
after an appearance before a grand jury? After their appearance at trial?
May they be held for a re-trial or for a trial on other defendants in the
same matter? Does an individual's liberty interest not, at some point, trump
the government's interest in ensuring a conviction? Comparing the Court-
created rules under the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial with
the Congressionally-created Speedy Trial Act demonstrates the superior
institutional ability of Congress to address this concern. The Court's
speedy trial jurisprudence is laden with vague factors that generally ensure
a government victory.2 6' While the Speedy Trial Act is certainly not a loop-
hole-free piece of legislation, clear timelines are identified that courts are
generally reluctant to draw. 61
For a number of reasons, Congress is in the best position to take up the
very troubling issues raised by the A1-Kiddcase.
CONCLUSION
The al-Kidd decision is something of a tempest in a teapot. Despite
the conflicting legal precedent that lent no easy doctrinal answer, the
Court's holding was practically inescapable. It should not be easier to
arrest a bystander than a suspected terrorist. The Court's holding, though,
may be meaningless to the parties in this case. John Ashcroft's policy of
aggressive detaining witness, even if legal, appears to be sufficient, under
an unchallenged aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, to have required
him to ensure detentions were sought consistent with the statute.
The practical effect of the al-Kidd decision will hopefully be legislative
reform. The broad and vague terms of the Material Witness Statute cannot
wait for judicial restrictions. Witnesses lack the means or incentive to
challenge their arrests or conditions of release. Combined with the small
number of material witnesses detained each year, these facts ensure that
courts are given few opportunities to restrict the government's power under
this statute. Leaving the statute unaltered is unacceptable. These rare
261 See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers'
Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 1oo MIcH. L. REv. 145, 227-28 (2001) (describing the
Speedy Trial Act as adding detail to the Supreme Court's vague standard). Butsee Greg Ostfeld,
Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The Validity of Open-Ended "Ends of Justice" Continuances Under
the Speedy TrialAct, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037 (997) (observing that timetable provided in the
Speedy Trial Act can be somewhat easily circumvented).
262 Justice Scalia's recent decision in Marylandv. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2oo),
allows police to re-request a Miranda waiver after a fourteen-day waiting period provides a
rare contrast to the vague time limits the Supreme Court typically establishes.
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detentions will continue to occur, most often under the radar, governed only
by the vague language of the Material Witness Statute. Our government
cannot be permitted to treat another citizen as it did Abdullah al-Kidd.
